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NEPAL’S PEACE AGREEMENT: MAKING IT WORK 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Nepal’s government and Maoist rebels have signed a 
comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) declaring an end 
to the ten-year civil war, paving the way for inclusion of 
the rebels in mainstream politics and June 2007 elections to 
an assembly that is to write a new constitution. The deal 
has been welcomed by an optimistic public but 
implementation will not be straightforward: some 
central questions remain, and there is a serious risk the 
elections could be delayed, putting strain on the whole 
process. The UN has very high credibility but it will not 
last indefinitely, especially if there are delays. International 
support for its monitoring of both the two armies and the 
elections will be critical. 
The peace agreement charts a course towards elections 
for a constituent assembly (CA) following formation of 
an interim legislature and government including the 
Maoists. In a detailed agreement on arms management, 
the Maoists have committed to cantonment of their 
fighters and locking up their weapons under UN 
supervision; the Nepalese Army (NA) will be largely 
confined to barracks. The constituent assembly, to be 
elected through a mixed first-past-the-post and proportional 
system, will also decide the future of the monarchy. 
The CPA was signed on 21 November 2006 after 
months of slow progress following the success of the 
April 2006 mass movement that overturned King 
Gyanendra’s direct rule. The talks were sporadic and at 
one point came close to collapse. The Seven-Party 
Alliance (SPA) government was criticised for a lack of 
urgency and clarity; the Maoists pursued negotiations 
with more coherence but paid less attention to democratic 
methods. The process has now delivered significant 
results but some of the problems that characterised it 
since April – primarily a lack of solid dialogue mechanisms, 
poor facilitation, little attention to confidence-building 
and an opaque, elite-driven approach – may continue to 
dog the next stages. 
The deal has its origins in the November 2005 SPA-
Maoist agreement signed in New Delhi, which provided 
a basis for the April movement and a guiding framework 
for subsequent compromises. However, it represents a 
temporary convergence of interests more than a permanent 
shift in the underlying outlooks and interests of the 
sides. The SPA and the Maoists retain different visions 
for Nepal’s future institutions, and individual parties’ 
electoral interests will come increasingly to the fore. The 
peace accord will not in itself alter the exclusionary 
characteristics of public life or deliver urgently needed 
economic progress. 
The significant remaining hurdles will all be exacerbated 
if elections are postponed: 
Weak governance. Post-April confusion turned into a 
worrying power vacuum across the country, which the 
Maoists were quick to exploit. The government has failed 
to re-establish law and order and democratic governance. 
Control over the civil service, election commission and 
distribution of local posts – always key bones of contention 
for mainstream parties – may be particularly intense in 
the run-up to CA elections. 
No deal on security structures. The Maoists want their 
fighters to be half of a new, downsized national force 
while the NA still wants them entirely disarmed. Neither 
army sees itself as defeated, so compromise will be 
difficult, and lack of progress may cause unrest among 
cantoned Maoist soldiers. With the NA suspicious of the 
peace process and yet to embrace democratic control, the 
Maoist demand for more solid guarantees is understandable. 
Maoist behaviour. At least until November, the Maoists 
continued extortions and abductions while showing little 
sign they are ready for meaningful power sharing and 
opening up of democratic space. Demilitarising their 
politics will require more than just laying down weapons; 
without this, chances for free and fair elections are limited. 
International involvement in the peace process has been 
mostly low-profile and supportive. The government and 
Maoists have asked the UN to take on new tasks and 
provide immediate assistance, and public expectations 
are high. But getting an effective monitoring force on the 
ground quickly will be a challenge: questions of mandate, 
funding, logistics and staffing need to be resolved quickly. 
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Nevertheless, the peace process has some momentum, 
which gives good grounds for Nepalis’ optimism. With 
continued compromise, political will and solid international 
support, a lasting peace is possible. Apart from shaping 
future institutional arrangements, the talks have agreed 
proposals for social and economic transformation – topics 
of immense public concern. However, only free and fair 
elections can give a government the necessary decisive 
mandate. Nothing should be allowed to put them off.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Government of Nepal and the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist): 
1. Build on the comprehensive peace agreement 
(CPA) by: 
(a) resolving remaining differences quickly 
and establishing the specified joint bodies 
and commissions, including, in particular, 
agreement on the scope and format of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission; 
(b) setting realistic timetables for the remainder 
of the process, including fallback plans if 
the constituent assembly elections must be 
postponed; 
(c) managing public expectations and 
disseminating information about the 
CPA; and 
(d) developing provisional arrangements to 
take urgent decisions as necessary by 
alternative mechanisms such as joint 
working groups so any delays in 
forming an interim government do not 
stall the peace process. 
2. Develop quickly plans to re-establish local 
governance and rule of law by: 
(a) prioritising re-establishment of effective 
policing, including by involving local 
Maoist militias in helping to manage the 
transition in areas they currently control; 
(b) deciding on a power-sharing mechanism to 
restore local government, deliver services 
and, where appropriate, deal with donors 
on implementation of local projects; and 
(c) proceeding with proposed local peace 
councils only if they fulfil clearly defined 
functions which do not make them rival 
institutions to legitimate local government. 
3. Build confidence on military matters by: 
(a) establishing effective bilateral frameworks 
for joint planning on cantonment 
management and working with donors 
willing to support the cantonment process; 
(b) addressing longer-term army restructuring 
and merging of Maoist fighters into the 
national army by establishing a joint 
committee as soon as the interim government 
is formed (as specified in the CPA) and 
proceeding with informal discussions until 
that date;  
(c) developing further confidence-building 
and dialogue mechanisms that include 
commanders of both armed forces and 
working to ensure their active support for 
the peace process and professional input 
into discussions over their future form; and 
(d) Making the NA-PLA-UN Joint Monitoring 
Coordination Committee an effective 
mechanism not just for monitoring 
agreement compliance but also for 
developing lower-level coordination to 
deal with potentially destabilising incidents 
such as natural disasters or public unrest. 
4. Make the next stages of the peace process more 
inclusive by: 
(a) actively seeking public input, including 
canvassing the views of conflict victims, 
without assuming that self-appointed groups 
are necessarily fully representative; 
(b) encouraging independent voter education 
initiatives in the run-up to the constituent 
assembly elections; 
(c) fulfilling promises to ensure fair 
representation of all marginalised groups 
(in interim bodies, as candidates for 
election and in negotiating teams, working 
groups, joint commissions and the like) 
and setting up a monitoring body or 
interim legislature committee to report on 
implementation; 
(d) Expanding public forums, focus groups and 
local consultation sessions to reach out to 
communities which have difficulty making 
their voice heard in the capital and considering 
holding interim legislature sessions and 
other such meetings outside the capital; 
(e) ensuring key decisions involve all SPA 
members, not only the top Nepali Congress 
Party and Maoist leaders, and encouraging 
broader debate, for example by recognising 
an official opposition within the interim 
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legislature and consulting with non-SPA 
parties; and 
(f) considering creation of a commission to 
broaden input into the new constitution-
drafting process. 
5. Investigate and resolve, as promised, all outstanding 
cases of alleged disappearances and cooperate in 
the investigation of criminal acts and war crimes 
committed during the conflict. 
To the Government of Nepal: 
6. Prepare for the formation of the interim government 
by completing implementation of existing policies, 
including: 
(a) strengthening democratic control of the 
security sector by dissolving the palace 
military secretariat, bringing royal guards 
under the Nepalese Army chain of 
command, halting army recruitment and 
investigating, as promised, disappearances 
and other abuses alleged to have been 
carried out by the security forces; 
(b) seeking advice from all concerned groups 
on implementation of the Rayamajhi 
Commission report and starting a wider 
public debate on acceptable forms of 
transitional justice; and 
(c) reducing the size of the palace secretariat 
and bringing it within the mainstream civil 
service. 
To the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist): 
7. Immediately cease all activities that contravene 
recent agreements and international law and 
ensure that affiliated and subsidiary organisations 
do the same, including: 
(a) ending extortion, intimidation and abduction; 
(b) halting military recruitment and ensuring 
the prompt discharge of any soldiers 
younger than eighteen; 
(c) recognising that the Maoist “new regime” 
is now defunct and disbanding all parallel 
government structures, including indirect 
mechanisms such as regional fronts; 
(d) allowing the police, as agreed in the CPA, 
to maintain order and investigate criminal 
activities; 
(e) assisting the return home of all conflict-
displaced individuals (IDPs) if they wish 
and expediting the return of seized property; 
and 
(f) demobilising local militia and ensuring 
they do not act as a parallel police force. 
To India, the U.S., the European Union and Other 
Members of the International Community: 
8. Maintain basic coordination, building on the 
consensus that restoration of rule of law and 
democratic space across the country is the top 
priority, and keep pressure on both sides to work 
towards a genuinely pluralist culture guaranteeing 
full civil and political rights. 
9. Support the UN monitoring mission by: 
(a) personnel, including by identifying and 
preparing candidates as soon as possible;  
(b) visible political encouragement, especially 
from missions in Kathmandu; and 
(c) cooperation with the UN to open local 
political space through coordinated civil 
affairs and police advisory assistance. 
10. Provide effective development, reconstruction and 
other post-conflict assistance, including by: 
(a) employing strict criteria, especially at the 
local level, when distributing aid to re-
establish local governance, and releasing 
funds only when measurable targets are 
met, such as redeploying police or getting 
Village Development Committee secretaries 
in place and working; 
(b) prioritising assistance that supports the 
opening of political space and the rule of 
law, even over aid for such security 
matters as cantonments and disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); 
(c) ensuring that proposed projects have the 
buy-in of all parties in the peace process; 
(d) supporting the electoral process with 
money, helping the UN monitoring mission 
(which may be best placed to coordinate 
electoral assistance) and building the 
capacity of the Electoral Commission also 
beyond the immediate round of polls; and 
(e) helping the government develop, including 
through extensive consultations, a plan for 
transitional justice that gives citizens a 
range of options to choose from and can 
gain broad public support.  
Kathmandu/Brussels, 15 December 2006 
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NEPAL’S PEACE AGREEMENT: MAKING IT WORK 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) between 
Nepal’s government and Maoist rebels, which offers the 
best chance of a stable end to the conflict since it began 
in February 1996,1 was signed on the evening of 21 
November 2006 after months of difficult negotiations 
following the April 2006 mass movement that brought 
an end to King Gyanendra’s direct rule. Its roots are in 
talks between the major parliamentary parties’ seven-
party alliance (SPA)2 and the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist), CPN(M), that were secretly initiated in 
New Delhi in mid-2005 with the Indian government’s 
blessing.3 The CPA broadly endorses the rough 
framework those talks produced but addresses many 
issues left unresolved in the earlier rounds. 
However, the deal is not as comprehensive as its name 
implies. It took a further week of intensive wrangling to 
agree the modalities for arms management; finalising an 
interim constitution – a task originally scheduled for 
completion in June 2006 – is taking even longer. The 
optimistic 1 December target for forming an interim 
government was missed, and there are serious questions 
over whether free and fair constituent assembly 
elections can take place as scheduled by June 2007. 
Some of the difficulties which delayed the peace talks 
(analysed below) have been addressed but there are new 
 
 
1 Recent Crisis Group reporting on Nepal includes Crisis 
Group Asia Report N°111, Electing Chaos, 31 January 2006; 
Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°49, Nepal’s Crisis: Mobilising 
International Influence, 19 April 2006; and Crisis Group Asia 
Report N°115, Nepal: From People Power to Peace? 10 May 
2006. Earlier Crisis Group reporting on the conflict is 
available at www.crisisgroup.org. 
2 The SPA members are the Nepali Congress (NC); Nepali 
Congress (Democratic) (NC(D)); Communist Party of Nepal 
(Unified Marxist-Leninist) (UML); Janamorcha Nepal; Nepal 
Workers and Peasants Party (NWPP); United Left Front (ULF); 
and Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Aanandi Devi) (NSP(AD)). 
3 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°106, Nepal’s New 
Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, 28 
November 2005. 
process challenges, for example deploying UN monitors 
within the tight deadlines envisioned by the parties. 
Nevertheless, the agreement is a major achievement for 
the mainstream parties and the Maoists, completed 
against considerable odds and in the face of some deep-
seated domestic and international scepticism. The 
process had to overcome a number of hurdles, and 
mutual mistrust brought the talks close to breaking 
point in early September. While the government 
sometimes seemed content to enjoy its new power 
without pushing to a resolution, the Maoists issued dark 
warnings of an October revolution, giving ample 
ammunition to those who saw little reason to trust their 
commitment to democracy. Overcoming such problems 
required skill and determination on both sides. 
Although the April people’s movement produced a 
dramatic transfer of power, many of the underlying 
aspects of the political landscape remained unchanged. 
The king has been chastened, losing much of his dignity 
and many of his powers. The collapse of palace prestige 
is notable but it does not mean the country will 
inevitably become a republic or that the palace can be 
ruled out as a future political player. The army has a 
new name and a new commander but despite some 
cooling of relations with the palace and a new law 
making it more democratically accountable, it remains 
largely autonomous and suspicious of the peace 
process. The mainstream parties and Maoists have 
hardly altered their political cultures, however much the 
former have promised to tackle their chronic 
shortcomings and the latter to reject violence and 
embrace political pluralism. The most palpable shift has 
been in the public mood. Opinion polls confirm a solid 
sense of optimism about Nepal’s future, and popular 
expectations have kept pressure on the SPA and Maoists 
to deliver a settlement.4 
 
 
4 Some 89 per cent of respondents in a survey commissioned 
by the National Democratic Institute felt “things in Nepal are 
going in the right direction”. “Nepal: A Cautiously Optimistic 
Public”, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research Inc., 17 
September 2006. This is a dramatic change in mood: two 
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This report examines the talks, the shape of the peace 
agreement, the new positions and tactics of the key 
actors and the challenges ahead. Separate reports in 
early 2007 will examine the constitutional process, the 
security sector in transition and Maoist politics and 
strategy. 
                                                                                       
years earlier, 95 per cent thought the country was headed in 
the wrong direction. “Faith in Democracy Endures, In Spite 
of Disappointments”, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research 
Inc., 16 August 2004. In a separate September 2006 survey, 
92 per cent were positive, saying the country was doing 
“good” (49 per cent), “okay” (22 per cent) or “very good” (21 
per cent). “Nepal Contemporary Political Situation III”, 
Interdisciplinary Analysts, Kathmandu, September 2006.  
II. APRIL AFTERMATH 
A. FROM POPULAR PROTEST TO 
PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY 
The April 2006 movement resulted in the reinstatement 
of parliament, which had been the longstanding central 
demand of the Nepali Congress (the largest parliamentary 
party) and latterly the SPA.5 Parliament is a crucial 
power base for the parties, especially important as they 
are the only side in the conflict without an armed 
component. It is a source of legitimacy (something they 
had lost following its May 2002 dissolution) as well as 
a means of exercising patronage and influence, for 
example in the allocation of committee chairmanships. 
The SPA formed a new government and distributed 
cabinet ministries among its constituent parties.6 Not 
surprisingly, the Maoists were unhappy that their 
proposal for an all-party conference instead of 
parliament was bypassed and aggrieved that their 
support of the April movement did not win them any 
role in the new power structure.7 
Questions immediately arose over the legality of 
parliament’s restoration – justified by political necessity 
rather than constitutional process – and over its mandate. 
King Gyanendra did not cite any constitutional clause 
when he reinstated the parliament “to resolve the 
ongoing violent conflict and other problems facing the 
 
 
5 Only the lower house, the House of Representatives, was 
reinstated. Strictly speaking, the 1990 constitution defines the 
lower house, upper house and the king collectively as 
parliament. The eighteen remaining members of the upper 
house (the 60-seat National Assembly, one-third of whose 
members are elected each two years for six-year terms) were 
given no role, though they still collect allowances. On the 
April movement and the restoration of parliament, see Crisis 
Group Report, From People Power to Peace, op. cit.; on 
constitutional definitions, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°99, 
Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, 
15 June 2005. The composition of the House of 
Representatives (elected in May 1999) is: NC 71 seats, UML 
68, NC(D) 40, RPP 11, NSP 3, NSP(AD) 2, Janamorcha 
Nepal 3, Sanyukta Janamorcha Nepal 3 and NWPP 1. 
6 A twenty-member cabinet was formed on 2 May 2006 with 
seven NC members, six UML, four NC-D and one ULF, NSP 
and Janamorcha Nepal. NC Forest and Soil Conservation 
Minister Gopal Rai was killed in a helicopter crash in October 
2006. 
7 The Maoists insist that SPA leaders had informally assured 
them that a reinstated parliament would only be active for 
weeks – long enough to set in motion the constituent 
assembly election process. Crisis Group interview, Maoist 
leader, Kathmandu, October 2006. 
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country according to the road map of the agitating 
seven-party alliance”.8 The Maoists were not the only 
ones to challenge the parliament’s self-declared supremacy, 
announced in an 18 May proclamation.9 The judiciary 
was also reluctant to endorse it without question, a full 
bench of the Supreme Court deciding on 9 June against 
accepting reappointment or retaking oaths under 
instruction from parliament. “Such reappointment 
would hurt the image of independent judiciary even at 
the international level”, commented Chief Justice Dilip 
Kumar Poudel.10 The court is also considering a 
privately-filed writ challenging the legality of the May 
parliamentary proclamation (see below).11 
The popular mandate granted by the April movement is 
hard to define: all that can be said with some confidence 
is that people at large were dissatisfied with royal rule, 
wanted the parties and Maoists to work together to end 
the conflict and were impatient for the chance to have 
their own say rather than remaining mute spectators. 
But the parties and Maoists had encouraged crowds to 
adopt their slogans and subsequently argued that the 
movement had endorsed their specific goals. The 
newly-constituted government claimed it had public 
backing for moving ahead with proclamations and 
legislation that went far beyond the primary task of 
resolving the conflict. The Maoists, supported by some 
other parties and civil society groups, insisted that the 
protests had demanded an immediate transition to a 
republic. Neither side wanted to wait for a genuine 
electoral mandate to pursue its policies. 
 
 
8 “Proclamation to the Nation from His Majesty King 
Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev”, 24 April 2006, available 
at http://nepalmonarchy.gov.np. See Crisis Group Report, 
From People Power to Peace, op. cit., for analysis. 
9 The May proclamation asserted parliamentary sovereignty and 
amended legislative, executive, military and palace-related 
provisions accordingly. On 4 July 2006, 50 further articles and 32 
sub-articles of the 1990 Constitution were amended. The 
proclamation is available at www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/ 
may/may19/hor_proclamation.php. 
10 “Reappointment of judges would tarnish independence of 
judiciary, says CJ”, nepalnews.com, 16 October 2006. A 
nationwide conference of judges was called “to maintain 
judicial independence” but later cancelled when some judges 
objected. 
11 The Supreme Court has rejected a writ challenging the 
constitutionality of the king’s 24 April 2006 proclamation, 
ruling that the restoration of parliament was justified by the 
“theory of necessity”. “Sarvocchadwara pratinidhi sabha 
ghoshanama prashna”, Kantipur, 23 September 2006. The 
government has similarly argued that as the parliamentary 
proclamation is a political matter, it cannot be questioned on 
legal grounds. “Ghoshanako sambaidhanik parikchan garna 
mildaina”, Nepal Samacharpatra, 25 November 2006. 
Parliament gave notice of its ambitions with its bold 
May proclamation that started reshaping national 
institutions, for example by declaring Nepal a secular 
state. In the following seven months it passed no less 
than 31 acts, with parliamentary committees 
considering a dozen more bills – a more prolific 
legislative burst than under any post-1990 
administration. Committees have played a more 
substantive role than plenaries, which have engaged in 
little debate and tended simply to endorse government 
decisions in the absence of a real opposition.12 The state 
affairs committee was heavily involved in finalising the 
new Army Act; while the public accounts and natural 
resources committees traced and publicised details of 
the king’s hidden properties. However, a 21-member 
parliamentary ceasefire-monitoring committee, formed 
on 30 May under Speaker Subash Nembang, was 
inactive. 
B. A FUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT? 
The government followed parliament’s example by 
confidently broadcasting a solid sense of its legitimacy 
and scope to act. Envisaged as a short-lived transitional 
administration, it embarked on longer-term development 
plans and even treaty negotiations as if it were a full-
fledged government.13 Ministers drew up an ambitious 
budget, called on donors to pour in funds and set off on 
foreign trips. Veteran Congress leader G.P. Koirala 
became prime minister for the fourth time, the obvious 
choice as the undisputed leader of the SPA and the 
Maoists’ preferred negotiating partner. 
The new government drew strength from the mood of 
euphoria at the success of the people’s movement and 
was boosted by international backing, especially from 
crucial states such as India and the U.S. However, it 
faced major challenges. Most importantly, it had even 
less reach than its royal predecessor, with most of the 
countryside in administrative limbo and no effective 
structures to deliver services or implement policies. 
Koirala, an octogenarian in fragile health, kept a firm 
grip on the peace process but had less time to 
coordinate a sometimes fractious cabinet or to lead 
normal policy discussions.14 The celebratory mood in 
 
 
12 Parliament has debated neither the peace accord nor, so far, 
the provisions of the interim constitution. 
13 Home Minister Krishna Sitaula was scheduled to sign a 
new extradition treaty with India in New Delhi in October 
2006 but cancelled the visit due to Maoist objections. 
14 Most meetings have been short and at his residence; discussion 
has been severely curtailed. “Senako kura aaunasath koirala 
swan-swan”, Jana Aastha, 29 November 2006. 
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Kathmandu and among top party leaders contributed to 
the perceived lack of urgency in pursuing peace talks 
and limited concern for maintaining public buy-in. 
April’s political upheaval delivered a measurably 
increased sense of security to ordinary people but did 
not transform daily life in other areas.15 Poorly thought 
out moves – such as a significant hike in petroleum 
product prices sprung on a volatile public in August – 
prompted discontent and a fear that the parties’ promise 
to improve on past behaviour was hollow. The petrol 
issue led to two days of serious disturbances in the 
capital; before the government formally backed down, 
individual leaders of each SPA party disavowed the 
decision they were collectively responsible for. The 
sense of disarray did not inspire confidence that the 
SPA would find the necessary unity and discipline to 
restore rule of law and see through negotiations. 
Some inter-party tension was to be expected. It was 
natural that the unity in the face of royal rule would not 
hold indefinitely. Hard bargaining over the allocation of 
posts delayed the formation of a full cabinet and led to 
an unseemly public row over the parliamentary 
speakership;16 plans to replace palace-appointed 
ambassadors who had been recalled after April were 
also stymied;17 constitutional bodies were left without 
members.18 UML leaders have repeatedly accused 
Koirala of taking unilateral decisions and have threatened 
to leave the government. But staying in power and 
retaining control over ministries affords the SPA the 
advantages of an incumbent government: the chance to 
divert some funds to party coffers, distribute jobs to 
 
 
15 Some 88 per cent of one survey’s respondents reported 
feeling safer than before April; only 1 per cent felt less safe. 
“Nepal Contemporary Political Situation III”, op. cit. 
16 The UML claimed the speaker’s post in return for allowing 
NC to take the prime ministership and key ministries. This 
displaced the natural candidate, Deputy Speaker Chitra Lekha 
Yadav of NC(D), who had also gained public support as a 
capable and articulate Madhesi woman. 
17 Inter-party tension has been particularly acute over 
ambassadorial appointments. The UML runs the foreign 
ministry but envoys are appointed by the prime minister; 
more than a dozen embassies have been without a head since 
May 2006. This was one of the reasons for Nepal’s poor 
campaign for a UN Security Council seat in 2006 (it was 
easily defeated by Indonesia). 
18 Donors sent a delegation of ambassadors to urge the prime 
minister to make appointments to the National Human Rights 
Commission, National Women’s Commission and Dalit 
Commission and other such agencies, saying their work had 
in effect been suspended. “Donors urge govt to make 
appointments in key state agencies”, nepalnews.com, 8 
December 2006. 
their supporters and tinker with appointments in the 
civil service and judiciary.19 
Still, the parliament and government were unanimous 
on two key political priorities: 
Clipping the king’s wings. Parliament curtailed the 
king’s privileges and abruptly ended the concept of 
king-in-parliament. Instead of royal assent, new acts are 
now approved by the speaker of the House of 
Representatives. Parliament also took over the right to 
determine royal succession; abolished the principle of 
male primogeniture; made the king’s property and 
income subject to tax and his acts subject to question in 
parliament and court; abolished the Rajparishad (royal 
council) and though as yet only formally brought the 
palace secretariat within the mainstream civil service. 
The first steps to loosen royal control of the army were 
also taken, with a change in name and supreme 
commander and a revised Army Act.20 These steps were 
not inspired by republican zeal but by the practical 
imperative to reduce the risks of a new royal coup. 
Several were more cosmetic than substantive; viewed 
together they suggest the shape that Koirala’s concept 
of “ceremonial monarchy” might take.21 
Undercutting the Maoist agenda. Parliamentary 
enthusiasm for more radical socio-economic change – 
including pre-empting the envisaged constituent assembly 
(CA) – reflected a belated attempt to co-opt and neutralise 
parts of the Maoist agenda. Major decisions on long-
term issues included tackling the army-palace relationship; 
the declaration of a secular state and the end of 
untouchability; and reserving one third of state jobs for 
women. 
 
 
19 For example, the UML’s Kathmandu district deputy secretary, 
Nirmal Kuinkel, was appointed member-secretary of the 
Pashupati Area Development Fund in November 2006. Party 
officials privately admit that government positions are useful for 
boosting seriously depleted party funds. Crisis Group interview, 
UML headquarters, Kathmandu, November 2006. 
20 In line with the parliamentary proclamation, multiple 
amendments to the Army Act (1959) were passed on 22 
September 2006. The revisions were the subject of lengthy 
committee debates in which army representatives secured 
important concessions. 
21 There is no common Nepali equivalent for the English term 
“ceremonial” and no clear conceptual separation between a 
“constitutional” and a “ceremonial” monarchy; the two terms 
largely overlap. Koirala appears to have in mind a constitutional 
monarch with no residual political powers and a purely symbolic 
role as head of state. See Ameet Dhakal, “Koirala advocates 
ceremonial monarchy”, The Hindu, 15 June 2006. 
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C. CONTESTED COUNTRY 
Political manoeuvring in Kathmandu took place against 
a background of lawlessness and confusion across most 
of the country. Despite poor monitoring mechanisms, 
the ceasefire held.22 But re-establishing anything like 
normal governance was hampered by Kathmandu’s 
weakness and Maoist intransigence. The rebels were 
happier to move into any vacant political space than to 
share power. 
An immediate characteristic of the transitional period – 
one much highlighted by the press – was increased 
criminality in cities, especially Kathmandu. The 19 
August protests against the petrol price hike were 
violent and unhindered by the police: dozens of petrol 
pumps, shops, restaurants and vehicles were vandalised 
while angry mobs killed a restaurant owner and paraded 
two female restaurant workers naked in the street in 
broad daylight. Little of this urban crime was politically 
motivated; the robberies and kidnappings were largely 
carried out by established criminal networks taking 
advantage of the policing vacuum. 
Amid mounting public concern in the capital, the 
government announced plans for a new metropolitan 
police but this will do little to address the general 
demoralisation of a national force which bore the brunt 
of the insurgency, was forced to abandon most of its 
posts and was then placed under army command.23 The 
government re-established 53 police units in urban areas 
after April but the Maoists resisted police deployment 
along highways and in rural areas.24 In many instances 
the police accepted de facto Maoist dominance and in 
effect recognised the rebels as a parallel authority. The 
twin responsibilities of Krishna Sitaula as home 
minister and chief SPA peace negotiator made him 
reluctant to take strong action to restore order. 
 
 
22 The ceasefire was tenuously defined and monitored, 
although both sides refrained from military activity. The 
Maoists declared a three-month unilateral ceasefire 
immediately after the April movement and extended it; the 
government responded with an indefinite ceasefire. On 26 
May both sides signed a 25-point code of conduct and formed 
a 31-member national monitoring committee, headed by 
former election commissioner Birendra Prasad Mishra. 
However, a formal bilateral ceasefire came only with the 
November peace accord. 
23 Of the 1,968 police posts before the conflict, 1,168 had 
been abandoned. 
24 Kiran Nepal, “Prahari chhaina, kanun-vyavastha shunya”, 
Himal Khabarpatrika, 1 September 2006. 
While the Maoists negotiated in the capital, they sought 
to demonstrate that their “new regime” of local 
government was not just functional but in many ways 
stronger than ever. They expanded their limited 
administrative activities – partly by being more active in 
district headquarters, partly by moving into space 
vacated by indecisive and weak state entities. This 
occupation of space was more than metaphorical: in 
several places the Maoists took over government 
buildings, including abandoned police stations, and used 
them as offices or militia bases.25 The confused 
environment enabled them to extend such practices 
beyond the countryside. Before being cantoned, their 
fighters had set up highway checkposts to monitor 
vehicles and collect money; political workers shifted 
from the villages to open offices in towns and cities. 
Maoist violence did decrease after the ceasefire but 
other intimidating behaviour appears to have increased, 
at least in the period before the CPA.26 The killings 
which took place differed from the targeted “annihilation” 
that was a trademark during the war. Most were due to 
torture in Maoist “people’s government” custody: in the 
first five months of the post-April ceasefire, almost 200 
people were arrested by the rebels, although most were 
subsequently released.27 Local Maoists may feel they 
have free rein until their “people’s governments” are 
dissolved.28 
 
 
25 The Maoist militias are distinct from their main, highly 
centralised, military force, the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA). Command of the militias is in the hands of local party 
committees; another difference is that their recruits, who 
function as a rudimentary police force, do not move around 
the country and generally serve in their own home areas. 
They are poorly armed and generally without uniform but as a 
sizeable force (the Maoists claim 100,000) across the country, 
they are in many ways the most active Maoist presence at 
village level. 
26 From April to September 2006 the Maoists were directly or 
indirectly responsible for at least twelve killings. “Human 
rights abuses by the CPN-M”, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Kathmandu, 
September 2006. INSEC, a human rights organisation, gives a 
figure of 21 for the 24 April–8 October 2006 period. The state 
was responsible for 23 killings, available at 
www.inseconline.org/hrvdata /Killingsafter20060424.pdf. 
27 From 26 April 2006, when the informal bilateral ceasefire 
began, to 25 September 2006; the Maoists “arrested” around 
184 people across the country on various charges. “Human 
rights abuses by the CPN-M”, op. cit. 
28 The CPA (Article 10.1) commits all parties “not to operate 
parallel or any form of structure in any areas of the state or 
government structure” after forming the interim government. 
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Extortion, the major source for the some $30 million the 
Maoists say they need annually to maintain basic 
activities, increased more dramatically.29 Despite 
promising not to force donations, it went up for a 
number of reasons. First, cadres used to raising cash this 
way could not resist the new opportunities afforded by 
post-April lawlessness. Secondly, a series of conventions 
by student, women, peasant, teacher and other affiliated 
organisations meant that their members needed to raise 
money. Thirdly, there appears to have been a 
calculation that extortion would soon have to end, and it 
was important to build up funds to see the movement 
through the remainder of the peace process and the 
election campaign. Fourthly, urban activity was more 
expensive, both for individual cadres and institutionally, 
as were the new demands of mass meetings and other 
political work. Following the CPA, initial reports 
suggest that extortion has decreased but it is too early to 
judge this trend. 
 
 
29 According to Maoist leader Dev Gurung, the PLA’s annual 
expense is more than one billion Nepalese rupees (some $15 
million) and the regional “people’s governments” require a 
similar budget. Interview, Samaya, 14 September 2006. 
III. THE TALKS 
A. A ROCKY START 
Although the parties and Maoists had worked alongside 
each other in the April movement, once it succeeded, 
their talks got off to a bad start. The Maoists’ preferred 
route of a roundtable conference had been trumped by 
the king accepting the SPA’s demand to restore the old 
parliament, prompting fears that they were being 
conspired against. They were also annoyed that the SPA 
was seeking to claim sole leadership of the movement, 
since they felt their own role had been at least as 
important.30 The Maoists called for the movement to 
continue but the lack of public response persuaded them 
to proceed with negotiations. A special central committee 
meeting in Punjab, India, in early May 2006 agreed a 
ten-point roadmap for peace talks.31 Both sides formed 
three-member negotiation teams32 and signed a 25-point 
ceasefire code of conduct on 26 May.33 
1. Eight-point agreement 
The dynamics in the early weeks were not encouraging. 
While the Maoists were busy with mass meetings 
pushing their agenda to new audiences, parliament had 
started taking decisions on longer-term issues without 
consulting them. Amid hints of public frustration at the 
lack of movement and Maoist complaints that the 
government was blocking the process, Koirala sent top 
negotiators Krishna Sitaula and Shekhar Koirala to 
meet personally with the Maoist leader, Prachanda.34 
These discussions bore fruit: five days later, on 16 June, 
 
 
30 See, Crisis Group Report, From People Power to Peace, 
op. cit. 
31 The Maoist roadmap laid down a preferred sequence: 
declaration of ceasefire; adoption of code of conduct; 
formation of a dialogue team; release of all political prisoners; 
initiation of dialogue; dissolution of old parliament, 
constitution and government; adoption of an interim 
constitution and formation of interim government through an 
all-party conference; demarcation of new electoral 
constituencies; constituent assembly elections supervised by a 
reliable third party; and restructuring of PLA and Nepal Army 
as per the popular mandate expressed through the election. 
Prachanda, press statement, 13 May 2006. 
32 The government team is led by Home Minister Krishna 
Prasad Sitaula and includes Pradip Gyawali and Ramesh 
Lekhak; the Maoist team led by spokesman Krishna Bahadur 
Mahara includes Dev Gurung and Dinanath Sharma. 
33 See Appendix B for a chronology of the peace process. 
34 This meeting took place at Siklesh in Kaski district on 11 
June 2006. 
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Prachanda made his first open appearance in 
Kathmandu, at the prime minister’s official residence to 
sign an eight-point agreement with the SPA. 
This agreement was a crucial basis for the subsequent 
negotiations.35 Both sides agreed to request the UN to 
monitor arms and both armies; they also decided to 
dissolve the parliament and the “people’s governments” 
in order to establish an interim legislature. That the deal 
was done in an atmosphere of goodwill made up for the 
acrimony of the preceding weeks. That it had been 
negotiated behind the scenes and only announced once 
both sides were ready also implied some sophistication 
in managing the process and learning from past 
procedural mistakes. 
However, the content of the agreement and the 
circumstances of its signing raised serious concerns 
about the SPA’s readiness to do business with the 
Maoists. Prachanda gave a press conference at the 
prime minister’s residence (his first public address after 
more than two decades underground), impressing star-
struck journalists and stealing the limelight from SPA 
participants such as UML General Secretary Madhav 
Kumar Nepal and NC(D) President Sher Bahadur 
Deuba.36 Politicians who were not involved in the 
negotiations, and many other observers felt the deal 
favoured the Maoists. Younger SPA leaders questioned 
the commitment to “dissolve the House of Representatives 
through consensus after making alternative arrangement” 
and suggested this “mistake” be corrected.37 
It transpired that the agreement had been hastily 
finalised without careful consideration by the SPA.38 
Gradually the signatories – the top party leaders, Koirala, 
Nepal, Deuba, Amik Sherchan and Narayan Man 
Bijukchhe – hinted that they were also unhappy the 
Maoists had done so well. Under internal and external 
pressure, Prime Minister Koirala unilaterally added a 
major rider: that parliament could not be dissolved until 
the Maoists’ arms were dealt with.39 In itself this was an 
eminently reasonable condition but reneging on a 
 
 
35 An unofficial translation of the agreement is available at 
www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=76803. 
36 Prime Minister Koirala was absent, though the press 
conference was held at his residence. 
37 Radheshyam Adhikari, “Pratinidhi sabha bighatanko 
auchitya”, Kantipur, 20 June 2006. 
38 One of Koirala’s confidants later implied that he gave the 
Maoists such favourable terms because he was seriously ill 
and needed to spend time on oxygen. Crisis Group interview, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
39 Koirala made this statement during an interview with state-run 
Nepal Television. See “Nepal Parliament won’t be dissolved until 
Maoists arms are managed”, www.samudaya.org, 4 August 2006. 
signed deal undermined trust; it no longer looked as if 
the interim constitution would be ready within a 
fortnight, as both sides had announced.40 
2. Engaging the UN 
The plan to request UN assistance was not derailed but 
it had to be translated into an official letter to the 
Secretary-General specifying what help was required. 
The government tried to pre-empt difficult discussions 
by drafting the letter itself, and Koirala sent it on 2 July 
without consulting the Maoists. While the latter had 
only agreed to have their weapons monitored, the prime 
minister requested help with “decommissioning”. This 
certainly reflected SPA thinking that the Maoists should 
give up their arms completely before joining an interim 
government – but went far beyond what had been 
negotiated.41 
Maoist cries of conspiracy were fuelled by secretive 
government behaviour. The letter was not published for 
three weeks and then only under pressure from a 
parliamentary committee. Once its content was confirmed, 
Prachanda condemned it and wrote separately to the UN 
on 24 July to express his “strong protest and disagreement 
over certain crucial points of the government letter”.42 
This unnecessary controversy exacerbated mutual lack 
of trust. 
At a public function on 7 August, one of the senior 
Maoist leaders, Baburam Bhattarai, accused Koirala of 
becoming the main obstacle to peace.43 Although his 
language suggested the dialogue was in serious 
jeopardy, both sides were playing a more measured 
 
 
40 An Interim Constitution Drafting Committee was 
established on 16 June 2006 under former Supreme Court 
Judge Laxman Aryal. Initially, it had only six members: 
Laxman Aryal, Harihar Dahal, Sindhunath Pyakurel, 
Shambhu Thapa, Mahadev Yadav and Khimlal Devkota. 
Following criticism of its exclusiveness, ten were added on 22 
June. The committee – whose members were balanced to 
represent party divisions – could not agree key issues and the 
resulting draft (replete with blank spaces and alternative 
proposals) was unusable. A member described it as an essay 
rather than a draft constitution. Interview with Shambhu 
Thapa, Interim Constitution Drafting Committee member and 
Nepal Bar Association chairman, BBC World Service Nepali 
service, 24 August 2006. 
41 See Shyam Shrestha, “Hatiyarma adkieko shanti varta”, 
Mulyankan, August 2006, for an analysis of the arms debate 
from an independent leftist perspective. 
42 Prachanda, “Letter to the UN Secretary-General”, 24 July 
2006, available at www.cpnm.org. 
43 “Koirala’s remarks may be aimed at spoiling peace 
negotiations: Dr Bhattarai”, nepalnews.com, 7 August 2006. 
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game than frenzied media reports suggested. Taking the 
criticism as only a pressure tactic, Koirala invited 
Prachanda to his residence for lengthy informal discussions. 
Having seen the risks of providing spoilers with 
ammunition, they reaffirmed a desire to bring the 
process back on track.44 A UN assessment mission headed 
by Staffan de Mistura had also impressed upon both 
sides the urgency of agreeing a joint approach if they 
wished to make the most of international assistance. A 
new five-point letter (sent in parallel copies; see below) 
to the UN dropped reference to decommissioning and 
more accurately reflected their understanding. 
3. Mutual suspicion 
The pattern of delays, recriminations, suspicion and 
eventual resolution was natural in the circumstances. 
The Maoists wanted to move quickly: they were better 
prepared, worried that delays would frustrate their 
cadres and keen to push ahead with interim institutions 
and elections while voters were still radicalised by the 
spirit of the April movement. The parties saw things 
differently: they needed time to put their house in order, 
prepare negotiating positions and plan for contesting 
elections. They were also busy (at least some of the 
time) trying to run the country. To the Maoists, each 
delay signalled conspiracy.45 Occasionally this may 
have been true but more often the stalling was down to 
disorganisation and divergent priorities. 
Maoist cadres were becoming restive, and their public 
threats of an “October revolution” were taken literally 
by many observers. At a central committee meeting in 
September held not far from Kathmandu,46 all their 
army’s divisional commanders and commissars 
participated as observers and presented situation 
reports. The six-day session saw serious debate and 
concluded that if peace talks were blocked, the only 
remaining option was revolt.47 The meeting appointed a 
new ten-member team under Prachanda to pursue the 
negotiations seriously.48 But it also drafted plans for a 
 
 
44 Crisis Group interviews, government and Maoist sources, 
Kathmandu, October-November 2006. 
45 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leader, Kathmandu, 
September 2006. 
46 The meeting was held at Kami Danda in Kavre district. 
47 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist sources, Kathmandu, 
September 2006. 
48 Besides Prachanda, the other members are Baburam 
Bhattarai, Ram Bahadur Thapa, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, 
Dev Gurung, Nanda Kishor Pun, Dinanath Sharma, Pampha 
Bhusal, Matrika Yadav and Khadga Bahadur Bishwokarma. 
They did not participate as a full team but added to the 
capacity of the original three-member group. 
two-phase mass movement: first demonstrations to 
bring pressure for progress in the talks; if that failed, 
then a decisive republican movement. 
Briefings from the security forces suggested the cabinet 
should take the threatened movement seriously, warning 
that the Maoists had plans to attack key locations in the 
capital and target ministers.49 When the government 
received information that hundreds of Maoist military 
cadres (PLA) had entered the Kathmandu valley shortly 
after the central committee meeting50 it rapidly 
deployed large numbers of both the civil police and the 
armed police on street patrols.51 Prachanda cancelled a 
public appearance and went underground. On 13 
September, the Maoists called a nationwide shutdown, 
following rumours that the Nepalese Army (NA) was 
transporting Indian weapons to Kathmandu. A national 
ceasefire monitoring team cleared the suspect vehicles, 
and the Maoists lifted their shutdown after four tense 
hours.52 They had not proved government deception but 
they had very publicly flexed their muscles and 
demonstrated their ability to start and stop coordinated 
action across the country with speed and discipline. 
B. THE STICKING POINTS 
Not surprisingly, this troubled period saw a breakdown 
in communication between Koirala and Prachanda. The 
Maoists were increasingly convinced that the prime 
minister was in league with the palace and army;53 the 
SPA was alarmed at Maoist sabre-rattling and nurtured 
growing doubts over their commitment to peace. With 
talks in effect suspended there was no chance to address 
the corrosive lack of trust or the remaining substantive 
issues. The government continued to press for more 
steps towards disarmament; the Maoists countered by 
insisting that the monarchy had to be dealt with 
 
 
49 Crisis Group interviews, security officials, Kathmandu, 
September 2006; and documents in the possession of Crisis 
Group. 
50 Crisis Group interviews, security officials, Kathmandu, 
September 2006.  
51 There are two distinct police forces: the civil Nepal Police 
and the Armed Police Force (APF), which was established in 
January 2001 (before the army was deployed) to boost the 
state’s counterinsurgency capacity. 
52 Prachanda, press statement, 13 September 2006. 
53 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist sources, Kathmandu, 
September 2006. Prachanda accused outsiders of interference, 
warning that “Foreigners are trying to dictate the present talks 
and the government isn’t able to decide itself”. “Interview 
with Prachanda”, Pratyakraman, August 2006. 
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immediately. The shape of interim institutions was a 
further bone of contention. 
1. Arms management 
The SPA had good reasons to identify the issue of 
Maoist weapons as a top priority. Apart from the 
conceptual difficulty of imagining a joint government 
controlling two separate armed forces, Maoist retention 
of arms could compromise free and fair elections (even 
if the weapons were under lock and key) and keep open 
the war option should the process not go their way. 
Government negotiators were well aware that signs of 
weakness in bargaining would further alienate important 
constituencies with serious concerns about Maoist 
intentions, not least the army and some international 
backers. 
The Maoists saw the question differently. Their arms 
were not only an integral part of their political culture 
but a practical defence in the uncertain environment of 
the talks while the Nepalese Army retained its full 
capacity.54 They believed that the need to separate arms 
from politics sequentially, in step with political progress 
that reinforced confidence, had been confirmed in 
earlier agreements, and they insisted that UN monitoring 
would be sufficient to neutralise their weapons during 
the election campaign. 
Beyond this, the Maoists reminded the government that 
successful disarmament would only be possible with 
agreement on the final stage of restructuring the national 
army and incorporating Maoist fighters. They felt that 
giving up any weapons before this would amount to 
surrender of their main bargaining chip.55 
2. The monarchy 
All parties agreed that the future role of the monarchy 
was a central issue of great public concern but they had 
differing views on both the outcome and the decision-
 
 
54 The Maoists have deep-seated concerns about possible 
Nepalese Army action if their own forces are disarmed before 
a full settlement; they still warn of a possible royal or military 
coup and took the appointment of Rookmangad Katwal, 
widely seen as a hardliner, as the new army chief as a 
worrying signal. Crisis Group interview, senior Maoist leader, 
Kathmandu, September 2006. 
55 The Maoists argued that the usual international 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
models are unsuited to Nepal and proposed what they called a 
Camping, Monitoring and Restructuring (CMR) procedure 
instead. Ananta, “Hatiyar vyavasthapanko bahas ra rajnitik 
nikasbare”, Sanshleshan, 20 August 2006. 
making process. Some mainstream parties had become 
more radical but the Maoists were still the most committed 
republicans; Congress and others beyond the SPA sought 
to keep open the possibility of a ceremonial institution. 
For the Maoists, the effort to declare a republic 
immediately through the new interim constitution was 
based partly on long-term analysis and partly on tactical 
considerations. They believed that deferring the issue 
could save the king, even if elections delivered a 
republican mandate – their assessment has long been 
that such a fundamental change would have to be part 
of a sudden, probably violent, transition rather than the 
result of parliamentary debate. More immediately, their 
proposed broader republican front was meant to give 
the impression of maintaining the April movement’s 
momentum and to pressure their opponents to make 
concessions on arms.56 
Despite the widely divergent views, the fact that neither 
side wanted to derail the entire process over this issue 
meant that the toughest bargaining was over modalities. 
The Maoists had two fallback negotiating positions: to 
suspend the monarchy in the run-up to the elections, 
thus limiting its power to meddle; and to decide its fate 
in a separate referendum – a UML proposal also supported 
by the NC(D).57 The Maoists reportedly forged a joint 
position with those parties.58 But in the face of strong 
Congress resistance – Koirala arguing that a referendum 
could prompt a powerful royalist campaign59 – and 
concessions on the arms agenda, the Maoists were 
happy to drop the idea, albeit at the cost of UML ill-
feeling.60 
3. Interim institutions 
Haggling over interim institutions was primarily a 
matter of power politics. For the Maoists the reinstated 
parliament was the “major obstacle for peace and 
progress”;61 for the SPA it was their nationally and 
internationally recognised source of legitimacy. SPA 
leaders worried that dissolving it would create a 
 
 
56 Crisis Group interview, Maoist source, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
57 It was argued that it was only fair to decide an issue of such 
wide interest by popular vote. 
58 Crisis Group interview, UML central committee member, 
Kathmandu, September 2006. Prachanda met the UML and 
NC(D) on 23 September 2006. 
59 Crisis Group interview, NC leader close to the prime 
minister, Kathmandu, November 2006. 
60 “Interview with Madhav Kumar Nepal”, Budhabar, 15 
November 2006. 
61 “Interview with Prachanda”, Pratyakraman, August 2006. 
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dangerous power vacuum which rebels or royalists 
could exploit; some were simply keen to extend the 
comfortable new status quo. 
Parties had to look at not only the bigger picture but 
also the concerns of their parliamentarians (MPs) and 
other leaders who would expect to be accommodated 
within new structures. The eight-point agreement was 
silent on the future of existing MPs but once it was 
agreed their positions would continue in any interim 
legislature, their concerns were assuaged. The make-up 
of new members was harder to agree. 
The Maoists retained the objectives of their original 
proposal for a Broader National Political Conference 
composed one-third each by SPA, Maoist and civil 
society representatives. This was never going to be 
acceptable to the mainstream parties: it suggested that 
they were only on a par with the Maoists, and many 
suspected the civil society appointments would give the 
body a dangerously radical tint. Congress proposed that 
the interim legislature include current MPs, upper house 
members and individuals selected through political 
consensus; the NC(D)’s “inclusive” concept was closer 
to the Maoist proposal.62 
C. BACK ON TRACK 
While the talks were dogged by public bad blood and 
seemingly intractable substantive differences, discrete 
efforts kept the sides on speaking terms. Even as Prime 
Minister Koirala traded accusations with Prachanda he 
gave his key negotiators, Krishna Sitaula and Shekhar 
Koirala, space to keep channels open. The main 
obstacle was internal Congress politics. Sitaula, who 
had emerged as a key player only since the royal coup, 
attracted jealousy and was criticised for weak 
performance as home minister. Shekhar Koirala 
similarly lacked broad support within the party but had 
prospered as the prime minister’s nephew and 
confidant. Both men had earned their spurs representing 
G.P. Koirala in the November 2005 negotiation of the 
twelve-point agreement in New Delhi. 
Behind a screen of public criticisms of the SPA, the 
Maoists were also playing a subtle hand. Their chief 
negotiator, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, had good links 
with his government counterparts. Like them he had 
been involved in the SPA-Maoist dialogue since the 
 
 
62 These proposals were submitted to the Interim Constitution 
Drafting Committee. See “Situation Update IV”, Conflict 
Study Centre, Kathmandu, 17 August 2006, for a convenient 
breakdown of the various party proposals. 
earliest post-coup encounters in New Delhi. The 
personal trust and practical experience built up since 
then remained at the core of the process even after the 
end of royal rule. Baburam Bhattarai presented himself 
as a hardliner insisting on the Maoist bottom line but he 
kept up good rapport with Madhav Kumar Nepal and 
other mainstream left leaders. 
The most worrying period came in early September, 
when mistrust reached a peak, and formal engagement 
was moribund. Both sides realised that the top-down 
nature of the process demanded the direct participation 
of their senior leaders. Koirala and Prachanda on 17 
September concluded that a summit meeting was 
essential. In keeping with the tradition of over-optimistic 
deadlines, they decided to garner public goodwill by 
announcing that this would happen before the major 
Dasain festival just a week away – a deadline they 
promptly missed. 
The summit talks finally got underway on 8 October 
2006, following several rounds of informal talks. After 
a week, the stop-start meetings – with breaks for the 
parties to consult – had only lead to agreement to 
schedule constituent assembly elections for June 2007. 
The announcement was staged to give an impression of 
progress: the dates had in fact been agreed in earlier 
informal discussions. Other sticking points remained. 
Consensus ultimately depended on Koirala and Prachanda 
reaching face-to-face agreement. They held more than a 
dozen informal meetings before the talks formally 
resumed on 8 November, and these were the basis for 
the understanding announced at midnight that night.63 
When Madhav Kumar Nepal objected, Koirala 
threatened that he and Prachanda could move ahead on 
their own if the UML would not cooperate.64 
The summit understanding repeated the commitment to 
hold elections by June 2007 and paved the way for a 
fuller deal by agreeing key issues. It smoothed over the 
misunderstanding of the preceding months by reiterating 
that all past agreements would be implemented, not 
renegotiated. It agreed a rough plan for managing arms 
(settling the number of cantonments and a locking 
system), the scope of the interim constitution (though 
 
 
63 According to an insider, non-Congress SPA leaders and 
even the facilitators were left with little to do during the 
summit talks. Biswadeep Pande, “Baluwatarko aitihasik rat”, 
Samaya, 7 December 2006. 
64 Crisis Group interview, UML leader, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. The UML salvaged pride by insisting a note 
of dissent stating its preference for a referendum on the 
monarchy and a fully proportional electoral system be added 
to the understanding. 
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not its crucial details) and a program to assist conflict 
victims and start a return to normality across the 
country. 
The outline agreement on arms management was the 
central focus of the final negotiations and the critical 
issue on which each side was reluctant to give any 
ground.65 The understanding laid to rest debates over 
the monarchy’s future by announcing that it would be 
decided in the first meeting of the constituent assembly 
by simple majority. These process issues were 
complemented by a joint commitment to end all forms 
of feudalism and develop a common minimum program 
for socio-economic transformation and a promise to 
investigate human rights violations and establish a truth 
and reconciliation commission. 
 
 
65 It is no coincidence that in mid-December arms 
management was still the main sticking point – although only 
in terms of to what extent it had to be implemented before 
forming interim institutions (for more see below). 
IV. THE DEAL 
A. WHAT WAS AGREED 
After two more weeks of difficult, but largely good-
natured, talks, the deal was ready, and negotiators 
announced the CPA that formally declared an end to the 
war.66 Its central elements are: 
Constituent assembly. The interim cabinet will finalise 
dates for constituent assembly elections with a deadline 
of mid-June 2007. There will be a mixed electoral 
system: 205 members to be elected on a first-past-the-
post basis from current parliamentary constituencies, 
204 by proportional representation on the basis of 
parties’ overall share of the vote, and sixteen distinguished 
individuals to be nominated as members by the interim 
cabinet, giving a total of 425 representatives.67 Parties 
have agreed to ensure representation of all regions, 
Madhesis,68 women, dalits69 and other marginalised 
groups when selecting candidates. All citizens eighteen 
or above when the interim constitution is promulgated 
will be eligible to vote. The CA is seen as not just a 
constitution-making mechanism but also the vehicle for 
a “historic campaign of building a new Nepal and 
establishing lasting peace”.70 
Interim constitution. The interim constitution – an 
essential prelude to formation of other interim 
institutions – was scheduled for completion on 26 
November71 but has proved harder to finalise than 
predicted. Teams resumed intensive discussions on it as 
soon as the arms management agreement was 
completed and now expect to finish the task in mid-
December.72 The primary difficulty has not been 
 
 
66 The full text of the CPA is available at nepalnews.com. 
67 A law will be made after consultation with the Election 
Commission. 
68 “Madhesi” is the term by which Tarai residents (excluding 
migrants from the hills) prefer to describe themselves, 
although it can also be used pejoratively. 
69 “Dalit” is the term preferred by “untouchables” at the 
bottom of the traditional caste hierarchy to describe 
themselves. 
70 CPA, Article 10.7. Much remains unclear about the 
functioning of the constituent assembly. This topic will be 
addressed in a subsequent Crisis Group report on 
constitutional process. 
71 This date was set by the 8 November government-Maoist 
understanding; the Interim Constitution Drafting Committee’s 
original deadline was June. It submitted its draft on 25 August 
(see above). 
72 Government negotiators, led by Home Minister Sitaula, 
include ministers Pradeep Gyawali and Ramesh Lekhak and 
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agreeing the constitution itself but the fact that its 
completion would then demand the prompt formation 
of interim bodies – something that Prime Minister 
Koirala, and some in the international community, do 
not want to proceed until the issue of how to manage 
Maoist weapons is definitively resolved, and the 
weapons themselves are under solid UN supervision. 
Interim legislature. The 330-member interim legislature 
that brings in the Maoists will be an expanded form of the 
current House of Representatives. That body will 
formally be dissolved but all sitting MPs (apart from 
those opposed to the April movement) and a handful of 
members from the upper house will fill 209 seats.73 The 
Maoists will have 73 seats, while 48 are to be allocated 
to representatives of affiliated political organisations 
and professional bodies, oppressed ethnic communities 
and regions and political personalities on the basis of 
mutual understanding between all parties.74 Victims of 
the Maoists have also demanded representation. 
Interim government. The interim legislature will elect 
a prime minister, who will form an SPA-Maoist cabinet 
to take responsibility for the remainder of the peace 
process and organise the constituent assembly election. 
Koirala, who is acceptable to both the SPA and the 
Maoists will almost certainly remain as prime minister75 
but the cabinet berths will probably be allocated in line 
with the balance of power in the legislature. 
Local administration and policing. The government 
and the Maoists agreed that the “Nepal Police and 
Armed Police Force shall give continuity to the task of 
maintaining [the] legal system and law and order along 
with criminal investigation” and “not to operate parallel 
or any [other] form of structure in any areas”.76 Interim 
local bodies will be formed at district, city and village 
level on the basis of mutual understanding. The Maoist 
                                                                                       
the NC’s Shekhar Koirala; the Maoists are led by Baburam 
Bhattarai and include Dev Gurung and Khim Lal Devkota, a 
former interim committee member. 
73 Some accommodation will probably be made for the ULF, 
the only member of the SPA that has no MPs. 
74 This was originally envisaged as bringing in apolitical 
figures but the seats will probably be divided between party 
supporters, with the SPA using it to bring in “new faces”. 
75 The Maoists feel they deserve to lead the interim 
government as they put the constituent assembly on the 
agenda but they likely will use this question as another 
bargaining chip. Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, 
Kathmandu, September 2006. 
76 CPA, Articles 5.1.6 and 10.1. 
“people’s governments” and “people’s courts” are to be 
dissolved on the day the interim legislature is formed.77 
Monarchy. As noted, its fate will be decided at the 
CA’s first sitting. The 8 November understanding 
effectively suspended the monarchy, stating that “no 
rights on state administration would remain with the 
King” and confiscating much of his property.78 The 
CPA endorses this although it does not use the term 
“suspension” and is silent about the position of head of 
state. The Maoists had pushed hard for the formal 
suspension of all royal duties and control of royal 
property as the best fallback position after their failure 
to secure a republic immediately.79 
Human rights and transitional justice. The CPA 
reiterates both sides’ commitment to international 
humanitarian law and fundamental principles of human 
rights. It proposes two commissions: a national peace 
and rehabilitation commission to build peace in post-
conflict society by running relief and rehabilitation 
programs for the internally displaced (IDPs) and other 
victims; and a high-level truth and reconciliation 
commission to investigate serious human rights 
violations and crimes committed against humanity by 
either the state or the Maoists. The exact scope and 
composition of these commissions has not been 
specified. 
Management of arms and armies. The CPA and the 
subsequent arms management agreement (see below) 
finalised the seven cantonment sites for the Maoist 
army and stipulated that arms and ammunition are to be 
locked in secure stores within the cantonments. Maoist 
commanders will have keys but the UN will monitor 
the stores from a distance with video cameras and siren-
activating sealing devices and may carry out site 
inspections. Maoist guards will be allowed to retain a 
few weapons for cantonment security.80 The Nepalese 
Army will put a similar number of weapons under 
supervision but be allowed to carry out essential tasks 
such as guarding borders, key infrastructure and VIPs. 
Principles of social and economic transformation. 
The parties to the CPA pledge to: 
 
 
77 8 November 2006 understanding, paragraphs 3(c) and 7(a). 
78 The property of the late King Birendra and his family is to 
be brought under a government-controlled trust; other 
property which Gyanendra received after coming to the 
throne will be nationalised. 
79 Crisis Group interview, Maoist central leader, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
80 The Maoists will retain 30 weapons for the security of each 
main cantonment and fifteen for secondary cantonments. 
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end the existing centralised and unitary state 
system and restructure it into an inclusive, 
democratic progressive system to address various 
problems including that of women, Dalits, 
indigenous community, Madhesis, oppressed, 
ignored and minority communities, [and] 
backward regions by ending prevailing class, 
ethnic, linguistic, gender, cultural, religious and 
regional discrimination.81  
Development plans are as vague as they are ambitious, 
calling for preparation of “a common development 
concept that will help in socio-economic transformation 
of the country and will also assist in ensuring the 
country’s economic prosperity in a short period of 
time”.82 Given the signatories’ divergent perspectives, a 
shared development plan is unlikely to be workable, 
though there could be agreement on some practical 
steps. The CPA does make significant decentralisation 
of power and a federal model more likely but it leaves 
the final decision to the CA (advised by a commission 
on state restructuring). 
B. THE DYNAMICS OF COMPROMISE 
The CPA is not truly comprehensive. It does open the 
way for a more durable ceasefire and charts the course 
for the rest of the process but even if it ends the armed 
conflict, it has deferred certain central issues. Structural 
changes have yet to take place: if the political 
understanding falls apart or the process is otherwise 
derailed, the Maoists are prepared to start another type 
of struggle, albeit not a simple resumption of “people’s 
war”.83 As long as their armed forces remain intact and 
the state security sector unreformed, there is potential 
for a rapid return to conflict. 
The compromises that secured the deal make good 
sense but each leaves further bargaining to come: 
Power-sharing. The accord effectively recognises the 
Maoist PLA as a parallel army and initialises plans for 
its merger into a new national army. In return the 
Maoists are to give up their hold on the countryside, 
dissolving their parallel administrations and allowing 
the state to resume its role as the sole guarantor of law 
and order. This may happen on paper but the Maoists’ 
ethnic and regional liberation fronts and village-based 
 
 
81 CPA Article 3.5. 
82 Ibid, Article 3.12. 
83 The Maoist leadership is disseminating this line to cadres in 
training sessions. Crisis Group interviews, different levels of 
Maoist activists, Kathmandu, October–November 2006. 
militias (now also active in urban areas) may take the 
place of the “people’s governments”.84 The peace 
accord has not defined or limited their role. 
The monarchy. With its fate to be decided by a simple 
majority in the constituent assembly, attention will shift 
to that body’s possible dynamics. No party is likely to 
have an absolute majority and thus be sure of the 213 
votes needed to push through its policies. Alliance-
building (more likely on specific issues than across the 
board) and pressure on individual representatives will 
be the new focus of attention. 
Inter-party dynamics. The deal was pushed through 
by Prachanda and Koirala – effectively, but at the cost 
of goodwill within the SPA. Since the referendum 
controversy, the UML’s distance from both the NC and 
the Maoists has increased. UML General Secretary 
Nepal asked: “Are the Maoists under contract to Congress 
and Girija Prasad Koirala?”85 The UML leadership was 
kept out of NC-Maoist discussion over the CPA, and 
Nepal initially refused to read the draft when he was 
summoned just before the signing ceremony.86 
C. PUBLIC REACTION AND DEMANDS FOR 
INCLUSION 
The peace accord was widely welcomed, domestically 
and internationally. It addresses two of the conflict’s 
critical elements: the Maoists’ armed insurgency and 
the struggle between the king and the parties in 
Kathmandu. But it only tangentially addresses the third 
element – the concentration of political and economic 
power in the hands of small elites at the expense of 
many marginalised groups. While the CPA promises 
socio-economic transformation, activists (especially 
from ethnic groups) have already criticised it for brushing 
over the main issues. Control over the peace process has 
not increased confidence; that all decisions were made 
behind closed doors by a handful of Brahman men 
leaves sceptics wondering if ten years of conflict has 
done anything to change underlying structures. 
 
 
84 The Maoists have six ethnic and three region-based 
“liberation fronts” that are responsible for the regional 
“people’s governments”; the militias, equipped with very 
basic arms, perform a policing role for them.  
85 “Interview with Madhav Kumar Nepal”, Budhabar, 15 
November 2006. 
86 He joined the meeting only after repeated requests from the 
prime minister and other leaders. Crisis Group interview, UML 
central committee member, Kathmandu, November 2006. 
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In the April movement’s aftermath, demonstrations 
demanding rights for particular marginalised groups 
featured prominently in Kathmandu. In contrast, there 
were few mainstream party gatherings. The Maoists had 
boosted their support by presenting themselves as the 
champions of all groups excluded from power but there 
is no guarantee this will translate into votes or workable 
policies within a coalition. The conflict has also radicalised 
activists, some of whom learned violent tactics when 
co-opted by the Maoists but retain their own agenda. No 
group is likely to start a separate armed uprising – 
although a Maoist splinter, the JTMM, has been carrying 
out violent activities in a few Tarai districts – but nor are 
groups likely to accept unsatisfactory compromises. 
The major issues include: 
Ethnic rights. With the constituent assembly agreed, 
ethnic activists – whose campaigns have been gathering 
momentum since shortly after the 1990 democracy 
movement – for the first time scent the real possibility 
of change. Although there are a multitude of different 
groups, whose specific aims are sometimes in conflict, 
there is broad agreement that the priorities are a federal 
state and significant job quotas for minorities. The 
Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities, an umbrella 
organisation, has demanded a “secular democratic 
republic state” within which ethnically based autonomous 
regions will have legislative, executive and judicial 
authority.87 It is questionable how representative the 
ethnic organisations are, and their politics is largely elite-
driven. Nevertheless they are a large potential constituency. 
Regional demands. The question of regional rights is 
most prominent in the Tarai plains that stretch along the 
border with India. Tarai residents, who describe 
themselves as Madhesis (a term that does not include 
the large population of settlers from the hills), are 
hardly represented in national institutions and are seen 
by many hill-dwellers as not true Nepalis because of 
their links to Indian communities over the border. Many 
(activists claim up to four million) have been denied 
citizenship, largely because of strict rules designed to 
protect a hill majority. Parliament passed a citizenship 
act on 26 November 2006, which rescinded the 
constitutional articles that were the basis of most 
restrictions.88 But not all claimants will be entitled 
 
 
87 “Situation Update IV”, Conflict Study Centre, Kathmandu, 
17 August 2006. See Crisis Group Report, Towards a Lasting 
Peace, op. cit., for analysis of ethnic demands for 
constitutional change. 
88 The NSP(AD), a member of the SPA with one cabinet 
minister, is a Tarai-based regional party which has 
under the new law, and putting it into practice in time to 
update voter lists before the elections will be extremely 
challenging.89 
End to caste discrimination. Parliament has 
proclaimed a complete end to caste discrimination but 
Nepal has a long history of such declarations (in theory, 
discrimination was abolished in the 1960s), which are 
rarely implemented. As with ethnic groups, the Maoists 
tried to recruit and radicalise dalits (the “untouchables” 
at the bottom of the caste hierarchy whom activists 
claim number some four million). Dalits have certainly 
improved their ability to campaign for their interests 
and have forced the issue of their rights onto the 
political agenda. Their chief demands are coherent and 
backed by increased organisational capacity but their 
voice in the upper ranks of political parties – including 
the Maoists – is still limited. 
Women’s representation. Female political leaders and 
NGO activists have been developing a more united 
front to press their demand for greater political 
representation and the abolition of discriminatory laws 
and constitutional provisions.90 Parliament passed a 
resolution on 30 May 2006 guaranteeing women 33 per 
cent of all positions in state bodies until they attain 
proportional participation.91 A June 2006 protest in 
front of government headquarters that demanded 
women’s representation on the committee drafting the 
interim constitution and on the parliamentary committee 
monitoring the peace talks kept the issue on the agenda. 
However, the May resolution has not been implemented, 
and women politicians are threatening to boycott the 
polls if action is not taken.92 
D. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
Until the summer of 2006, the UN had a limited role in 
the search for peace. Repeated offers of the Secretary-
General’s good offices were rebuffed (despite enthusiastic 
                                                                                       
concentrated on lobbying for resolution of the citizenship 
issue. 
89 The government plans to send task forces to the Tarai 
districts to expedite the process but experience indicates they 
will find it hard to deliver; the political and bureaucratic elites 
are unlikely to embrace the more liberal dispensation 
wholeheartedly. 
90 Women politicians from across the political spectrum have 
formed an active Inter-Party Women’s Alliance (IPWA). 
91 “33 per cent reservations for women”, ekantipur.com, 30 
May 2006. 
92 “Women threaten poll boycott”, The Kathmandu Post, 7 
December 2006. 
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public support), and there was a perception that India 
would resist such involvement in its neighbourhood. 
The establishment of a major human rights monitoring 
mission in early 2005 started to change this picture by 
demonstrating the utility of well-defined UN assistance 
and allaying Indian concerns of a possible erosion of its 
regional hegemony. The Maoists had long seen a need 
for the UN in a peace process and promised cooperation; 
this took more solid form with the November 2005 
twelve-point agreement in which the SPA also endorsed 
the concept. 
Once the post-April government and the Maoists agreed 
on inviting the UN, an assessment mission led by Staffan 
de Mistura arrived promptly.93 With some boldness, de 
Mistura urged the two sides to agree quickly on a 
mandate if they were serious about seeking help: while 
not quite an ultimatum (which the UN was in no position 
to deliver), this sense of urgency spurred a more precise 
consensus on what should be requested. On 9 August, 
the government and the Maoists sent parallel letters to 
the Secretary-General asking the UN to (i) continue its 
human rights monitoring through the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); (ii) assist 
monitoring of the ceasefire code of conduct; (iii) deploy 
civilian monitors to verify the confinement of Maoist 
combatants and weapons within designated cantonment 
areas; (iv) monitor the national army to ensure it remains 
in barracks and its weapons are not used; and (v) 
observe the CA election in consultation with the parties. 
By its own standards, the UN has moved remarkably 
quickly to assist. Ian Martin, who had been heading the 
successful OHCHR mission, was appointed as the 
Secretary-General’s Personal Representative to the 
peace process and rapidly assembled a small team of 
expert advisers. Although not tasked with facilitating 
the peace talks, the UN’s crucial role in helping develop 
a workable plan for arms management put it at the heart 
of one of the central political debates. This role was 
technical by definition but also included a critical 
diplomatic aspect.94 
The arms management deal has boosted the UN’s 
credibility while adding to already exaggerated 
expectations. The UN’s high visibility increases 
 
 
93 De Mistura’s team was in Kathmandu from 28 July to 3 
August to meet political leaders and visit NA and PLA bases. 
De Mistura also met Indian officials in New Delhi. 
94 For example, after separate meetings with the prime 
minister and Prachanda, Ian Martin briefly visited Delhi in the 
third week of October to brief Indian officials and ascertain 
their views. “Martin rushes to India, acquires Delhi’s view on 
Nepal’s arms mgmt”, ekantipur.com, 17 October 2006. 
stability but also leaves it exposed to criticism should 
anything go wrong – and some politicians have already 
found it convenient to pin the blame for delays on it. A 
government negotiator complained informally to the 
media that the peace process was being held back by 
slow UN response.95 Commentators have started to 
warn that the elections may be delayed due to the UN’s 
“bureaucratic problem”.96 Deputy Prime Minister K.P. 
Oli pointed to “the time needed for the United Nations 
bureaucratic procedures” as a reason for slow progress.97 
Still, the basic elements of a successful mission are in 
place. Domestic political actors have worked well with 
the UN (its longstanding relationship with the Nepalese 
Army has also helped to build confidence), and it has 
received the solid backing of key international players, 
including India. The Security Council approved the 
Secretary-General’s proposals for assistance with almost 
unprecedented ease, and the first monitors will arrive 
soon.98 An assessment team has been dispatched to plan 
a full mission;99 unless it recommends a huge presence, 
funding is not likely to be a major problem, although 
recruitment within tight deadlines will be challenging.100 
The most important question is whether enough monitors 
can be in place quickly enough to build confidence in 
the run-up to elections. 
 
 
95 Crisis Group interview, government negotiator, Kathmandu, 
December 2006. 
96 “Nepal peace process update: UN delays everything”, 
blog.com.np, 7 December 2006. 
97 “Interview with DPM K.P. Oli”, ekantipur.com, 7 December 
2006. 
98 “Recruitment continues for a team of up to 35 advance 
monitors to be deployed, ahead of a full-fledged mission, to 
monitor provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We 
also are proceeding with our efforts to recruit 25 electoral experts 
to assist in carrying out Constituent Assembly elections”, 
reported the Secretary-General’s spokesperson, Stephane 
Dujarric. “UN assessment team to visit Nepal from Monday to 
plan for full-fledged mission”, IRIN, 7 December 2006. The first 
monitors are likely to arrive in the second half of December; 
funding is available from the ACABQ, the UN’s funding 
committee, which can approve up to $10 million. 
99 The technical assessment mission from 10–16 December 
was led by Ian Martin and included members of his 
Kathmandu staff and New York-based experts in political and 
military affairs, logistics and public information. 
100 Total personnel might be as high as 1,000, including local 
staff, with perhaps 150-200 monitors plus UN volunteers and 
international electoral advisers. The mission will be classified 
as a “special political mission”; these generally fall under the 
Department of Political Affairs but can also be run by the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Monitors, including 
civilians with military backgrounds and serving military 
officers, will be unarmed and in civilian dress. 
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V. PEACE POLITICS: SAME 
PLAYERS, NEW PLANS 
The April movement left Nepal’s main political actors 
facing new scenarios and developing new tactics. 
However, it changed neither the fundamental interests 
the parties represent nor their political and institutional 
cultures. Despite established politicians’ low visibility 
during the April protests, no new leaders emerged to 
eclipse them. 
A. THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES 
The SPA’s seven parliamentary parties were the big 
winners in April, returning to government and claiming 
the lion’s share of the credit for a movement they hardly 
led.101 Still, their gains were not entirely undeserved. 
When the alliance first coalesced, critics suspected it 
would rapidly disintegrate; its insipid efforts to rouse 
popular protest in the wake of the royal coup had 
inspired little confidence. But the parties have more or 
less maintained their unity (impressive by any standard, 
especially their own), used risky talks with the Maoists 
to deliver a workable peace deal and ultimately managed, 
albeit far from single-handedly, to see through a popular 
protest movement. They achieved all of this without 
using force – unlike the two more extremist forces they 
faced down. 
If this has boosted overall morale, it has especially 
burnished the reputation of Congress leader and Prime 
Minister Girija Prasad Koirala. When he refused to join 
the ill-fated coalition government under his rival, Sher 
Bahadur Deuba, in June 2004, he was widely criticised 
as the main obstacle to political consensus but creation 
of the SPA, the handling of the negotiations with the 
Maoists and his steering of the new government have 
brought him renewed respect. 
The crucial calculations the parties must now make are 
how to position themselves during the next stages of the 
peace process and how to maximise their chances in the 
constituent assembly elections. Leftist parties with 
populist policies face the difficulty of distancing 
themselves from the Maoists; Congress under Koirala 
has been much criticised for refusing to join the strident 
 
 
101 On party motivations during the twelve-point agreement 
talks, see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Alliance, op. cit. 
For a party overview see Krishna Hachhethu, “Political 
Parties of Nepal”, Social Science Baha Occasional Papers 1 
(Kathmandu, 2006). 
republican trend but has earned itself leadership of a 
broader, more conservative, block. The parties’ election 
plans are not yet clear but they seem confident that 
traditional supporters will vote for them regardless of 
Maoist intimidation and a long record of past poor 
performance. 
“Conservatives” 
The NC is the largest parliamentary party and the 
strongest conservative force. It is still seen by some – 
including many of those hostile to party politics as a 
whole – as the only truly democratic party in the country, 
since the UML only accepted parliamentary democracy 
in the aftermath of the 1990 movement. Koirala’s 
careful attitude toward the king (holding out the 
possibility of his retaining a ceremonial role) enables 
him to position himself as the protector of broader 
traditional interests but leaves him open to criticism 
from party activists who want a more radical line. 
Koirala’s nuanced position has given birth to conspiracy 
theories – that he is in league with the king, army or India – 
and harsh criticism from an increasingly republican 
intelligentsia. However, he has moved little from his 
long-standing tenets: even when allying with the 
Maoists under royal rule, he steered clear of 
republicanism in favour of “full democracy”. He 
resisted post-April efforts to form a broad republican 
alliance by arguing that a system restored by the king 
should not overthrow him.102 Senior Congress figures 
give credence to the idea that international pressure to 
retain the monarchy as a counterbalance to the Maoists 
may have influenced Koirala.103 But his stance may yet 
deliver party-political advantage: the country is 
probably still more conservative than fervent republicans 
would like to believe, and presenting himself as the 
king’s protector will invite financial and practical help 
from royalists. At the same time, he is conscious of the 
need to give the palace some reason to accept the 
constituent assembly: to write off any chance of its 
survival would be to invite a last stand by hardliners. 
Still, many NC activists and district-level leaders are 
influenced by republican thinking and worry that 
conservative policies will be hard to sell to voters.104 
Congress displayed more radical leanings when it dropped 
 
 
102 Crisis Group interview, NC leader close to Koirala, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
103 Crisis Group interviews, Nepali Congress leaders, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
104 The NC’s central working committee has ordered MPs and 
party leaders to canvas activists on the monarchy. “NC to send its 
leaders to villages”, nepalnews.com, 5 December 2006. 
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the constitutional monarchy from its party statute in late 
2005.105 However, anti-monarchical opinion is hardly 
reflected in the central leadership, and the king’s retreat 
may have defused some of the republican sentiment 
evident before April 2006.106 The party may ultimately 
refuse to take a definitive stance or leave it to 
candidates’ individual judgement.107 Congress may also 
struggle to keep its ethnic support base intact. While the 
Maoists are touting populist slogans of autonomy and 
self-determination, Congress has yet to decide whether 
it will support ethnic-based regional autonomy or, more 
likely, endorse an alternative federal structure. 
Congress’ internal politics are as murky as ever. Despite 
public professions of contrition at past corruption and 
poor governance, party machinery has quietly been put 
back in the hands of some of the worst offenders. A 
special court conveniently cleared senior leaders Khum 
Bahadur Khadka and Govinda Raj Joshi of major 
corruption charges on technical grounds;108 they are 
reportedly playing an important role within the party, 
carefully out of public view.109 Given Koirala’s age, the 
succession question looms ever larger. He has not 
anointed an heir, and contenders are jostling for 
position. Perverse as it seems, his most likely successor 
is former Prime Minister Deuba, who has presided over 
some of the most unhappy events in recent history and 
leads a splinter party, the NC(D).110 
The two parties have no fundamental differences; 
disputes revolve around personalities and accommodation 
of NC(D) leaders in the reunited party’s top ranks.111 
 
 
105 This was at its eleventh general convention, 30 August–1 
September 2005; there was also debate over a republican agenda. 
106 Only one central NC leader, Narahari Acharya, supports a 
republic. He has started a separate campaign, assisted by 
political scientist-turned-politician Krishna Khanal and 
former NC student leader Gagan Thapa; they campaigned in 
western and eastern hill districts in November 2006. 
107 Crisis Group interviews, NC leaders, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
108 Khadka was cleared on 15 November 2006 (the court 
ruled the charge not proven); the next day, the same panel 
dismissed the case against Joshi because of its “delayed 
registration”. Hari Bahadur Thapa and Balkrishna Basnet, 
“Bhrashtachar muddama ekpachhi arko saphai”, Kantipur, 17 
November 2006. 
109 Crisis Group interview, NC source, Kathmandu, November 
2006. 
110 The NC(D) split from the NC in 2002, when the NC 
refused to endorse then Prime Minister Deuba’s unilateral 
decision to request the dissolution of parliament. 
111 The NC(D)’s primary demand is for top to bottom 
reunification of all party committees, thus ensuring rehabilitation 
of its supporters. Top leaders also want guarantees they will not 
However, initial haste to reunite – prompted partly by 
international encouragement – has cooled, both sides 
preferring to defer the issue until after the formation of 
interim institutions (entering the new legislature and 
government separately will entitle them to more seats).112 
The NC(D) also has internal divisions: its November 
2006 district chairmen’s conference pushed for a 
republican line,113 a position also supported by prominent 
leaders such as Pradip Giri, Bimalendra Nidhi, Minendra 
Rijal and Prakash Man Singh.114 
The small royalist parties, still largely composed of 
politicians who made their name under the pre-1990 
partyless Panchayat system, may find themselves in 
broad alliance with Congress in opposing both Maoist 
and mainstream leftists. The primary royalist party, the 
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), has normally garnered 
around 10 per cent of the national vote but has suffered 
from splits. Its most important offshoot is the Rashtriya 
Janashakti Party, headed by astute former Prime 
Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa, which has absorbed the 
tiny Prajatantrik Nepal Party of former royal minister 
Keshar Bahadur Bista.115 The unrecognised RPP faction – 
created under royal rule in a palace-engineered split – 
limps on with a change of leader, marginalised by 
events.116 
Royalists have not shrunk from criticising the king. 
RPP President Pashupati Shamsher Rana has bitterly 
accused the monarch of splitting his party and hints that 
the RPP may adopt a less palace-friendly line;117 Thapa 
                                                                                       
be demoted in a reunited party. Crisis Group interviews, NC(D) 
leaders, Kathmandu, November 2006. 
112 Compared to possible NC successors such as Ram Chandra 
Poudel or Sushil Koirala, Deuba is a heavyweight, with three 
terms as prime minister and good international contacts. Crisis 
Group interviews, Congress leaders, Kathmandu, November 
2006. 
113 “NC (D) district presidents demand to go for democratic 
republic”, nepalnews.com, 16 November 2006. 
114 Deuba has acknowledged this pressure and promised the 
party’s next general convention will settle its stance on the 
monarchy: “Majority of colleagues feel that the King is no 
good and should not be kept, but this subject should be settled 
by general convention or national conference”. “Deuba says 
majority in his party want the King out”, nepalnews.com, 6 
December 2006. 
115 “Bista’s party merges into RJP”, nepalnews.com, 30 
November 2006. 
116 Rabindra Nath Sharma, who replaced Kamal Thapa as 
head of the splinter group, has found few takers for his 
proposed democratic front against republicanism. 
117 “RPP not to back monarchy: RPP chief Rana”, nepalnews.com, 
21 September 2006; “RPP to launch nationwide campaign to 
change its policy”, nepalnews.com, 7 December 2006. 
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was never a slavish royalist even under the Panchayat 
and was one of the first pro-palace politicians to realise 
the king’s star was waning and to dress his party in 
more progressive clothes. Both supported curtailing the 
king’s powers and have been constructive in the new 
parliament, generally voting with the SPA, despite 
being excluded from government and denied recognition 
as an official opposition.118 
“Progressives” 
The April movement had a bittersweet outcome for the 
mainstream leftist parties. The popular mood was more 
supportive of their general approach than ever but 
Congress was firmly in the SPA driving seat, and they 
faced difficult choices vis-à-vis the Maoists. All on the 
left, including the Maoists, are conscious that a successful 
peace process is unlikely to leave room for two large 
leftist parties. Jostling for control of the mainstream left 
has begun. 
The parliamentary left is dominated by the UML, which 
accepted multiparty democracy in 1991 and has since 
served in government as well as being the largest party 
in local councils. It burnt its fingers by joining the Deuba 
coalition in June 2004 and has mixed feelings about its 
role in government. Ever conscious of its junior 
position, it has sometimes acted as an opposition within 
the cabinet, publicly criticising SPA policies and suggesting 
its own approach is more principled. But it dare not be 
seen to undermine unity during the peace process and 
needs a stake in central power in the run-up to elections. 
The parliamentary left also incorporates smaller parties 
with differing interests. Janamorcha Nepal (People’s 
Front Nepal), the political front of CPN (Unity Centre-
Masal),119 is the most radical and close to the Maoists 
on many issues apart from the use of violence; its chairman, 
Amik Sherchan, is one of two deputy prime ministers. It 
has been weakened by splits but still is a crucial bridge 
between the Maoists and the mainstream.120 The United 
 
 
118 Pashupati Rana has consistently argued that the RPP 
should at least be accorded the role of official opposition. 
“Chand, Rana discuss peace process with PM”, 
nepalnews.com, 13 November 2006. 
119 Party leader Mohan Bikram Singh says the Unity Centre 
itself will remain underground as complete democracy has 
not yet been achieved. “CPN (Unity Centre-Masal) to remain 
underground”, nepalnews.com, 8 December 2006. 
120 In the 1970s Sherchan was one of Prachanda’s mentors; 
his party retains close links to the Maoists and will probably 
join their republican front. This relationship, long 
controversial in the party, prompted its recent division into 
three factions (one group led by Sherchan has one MP, 
Lilamani Pokhrel; two rebel MPs, Pari Thapa and Nawaraj 
Left Front is a disparate grouping of three tiny parties 
without MPs, although its representative, Prabhu Narayan 
Chaudhary, is the land reform minister. Its members 
disagree over the republican agenda and could split on 
this issue.121 The Nepal Workers and Peasants Party is 
the only SPA member to have stayed out of the 
government. While supporting the peace process, the 
party will not join the interim government and says it 
will play an opposition role in the interim legislature;122 
it has been critical of various SPA policies.123 
The UML’s August 2006 central committee meeting 
decided to campaign for a democratic republic through 
the constituent assembly124 but positions within the 
party are not so clear-cut. Accommodation within the 
post-1990 parliamentary system has dulled the party’s 
formerly radical edge and led many leaders to feel 
comfortable with existing institutions, including the 
monarchy.125 General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal 
has successfully balanced tensions between two wings: 
its chief representative in the government, Deputy 
Prime Minister K.P. Oli is considered right-leaning, 
while a left-leaning lobby, led by Jhalanath Khanal and 
Bamdev Gautam, sees advantage in an alliance with the 
Maoists. Should the general secretary’s comfortable 
partnership with Oli weaken, he could be pushed 
towards Khanal and Gautam to secure his position.126 
                                                                                       
Subedi, formed another group under Chitra Bahadur Ale; the 
third group, led by Chitra Bahadur KC, has three MPs 
including KC, Hari Acharya and Dila Ram Acharya. 
121 ULF coordinator C.P. Mainali is allegedly against a 
republic. Crisis Group interviews, ULF leaders, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. The Maoists have approached Minister 
Chaudhary to join their party or the proposed republican 
front. Chaudhary is also the chairman of CPN (Unified 
Marxist), a member of the ULF; its General Secretary, Bishnu 
Bahadur Manandhar, resigned in October 2006 after clashing 
with Chaudhary. 
122 “NWPP to play oppn’s role in interim govt”, The 
Himalayan Times, 23 November 2006. 
123 NWPP chairman Bijukchhe’s vote against the citizenship 
bill on 26 November was the first for an SPA MP against the 
government. 
124 Crisis Group interview, UML central leader, Kathmandu, 
September 2006. 
125 For example, the UML appeared to back Koirala’s 
ceremonial monarchy agenda by supporting parliamentary 
amendments of royal laws and regulations rather than 
insisting on full suspension. Other leftist parties doubt its 
commitment to republicanism. NWPP leader Narayan Man 
Bijukchhe suspects the UML would abandon the republican 
agenda in exchange for the prime ministership. “Vartako 
sancho dillima chha”, Kantipur, 23 October 2006. 
126 Crisis Group interviews, UML leaders, Kathmandu, 
October-November 2006. 
Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work 
Crisis Group Asia Report Nº126, 15 December 2006 Page 19 
 
 
 
 
The UML’s own republican front proposal could unite 
mainstream left votes in the CA elections, although the 
Maoists will likely push ahead with a separate version. 
The UML also hopes its republican agenda will tempt 
back into the fold the many party workers who – 
voluntarily or under coercion – joined the Maoists. It 
remains a disciplined, well organised party with much 
healthier inner democracy than most of its rivals.127 
Despite some support for the idea, it is unlikely the 
Maoists and UML could achieve anything more than 
the most basic tactical alliance on certain issues. Each is 
a threat to the other’s long-term future, and there is little 
basis for a shared vision. Prachanda provocatively 
claimed that the UML would ultimately be merged into 
the CPN(M); Madhav Kumar Nepal responded: “Is it 
not enough [for them] to drink the blood of one-and-a-
half hundred UML cadres? How much blood do they 
want?”128 Tussles over positions in the proposed interim 
government have added to the tension. The UML sought 
Maoist support for its bid to replace Koirala as interim 
prime minister but Prachanda publicly rebuffed this.129 
B. THE MAOISTS 
The Maoists’ strategic goal remains a communist 
republic (janabadi ganatantra), although they have 
accepted the concept of a democratic republic (loktantrik 
ganatantra) as an intermediate objective.130 Their official 
policy is that the constituent assembly can be the first 
step in a peaceful transition to that eventual communist 
republic. However, their private analysis is that the 
monarchy is unlikely to be removed without a further 
violent confrontation. They have always believed that 
the strength of Nepal’s conservative institutions should 
not be underestimated and still see mainstream parties 
as reactionaries and revisionists who will resist radical 
 
 
127 In early December 2006, the UML completed a three-
month “day-and-night” campaign, during which it renewed 
thousands of its cardholder’s membership and provided 
political training. Ameet Dhakal, “Underestimate the UML at 
your own peril”, The Kathmandu Post, 5 December 2006. 
128 “Interview with Madhav Kumar Nepal”, Budhabar, 15 
November 2006. 
129 Crisis Group interview, Maoist central leader, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
130 They emphasise that even their ideal communist republic 
would allow competitive politics among “anti-imperialist and 
anti-expansionist’’ forces. See Crisis Group Asia Report 
N°104, Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, 
27 October 2005. 
reform.131 They are preparing for both routes – or a 
combination of the two – by putting serious effort into 
normal political campaigning while keeping their cadres 
ready for a final fight if necessary.132 
The public political activity which the Maoists started 
immediately after the April movement has gained new 
momentum since the peace agreement. They plan to 
restructure the party to increase its effectiveness in open 
politics, especially in elections.133 For dealing with 
potential allies, their major priority is to form a democratic 
republican front134 and tempt small leftist groups and 
individuals to join the CPN(M).135 They have concentrated 
on boosting their presence in the urban areas where they 
have traditionally been weak. In Kathmandu, they claim 
some 1,500 full-time political activists compared to 70 
before April 2006.136 They have tried to curry support 
among the sceptical local Newar community with a 
“valley republican campaign” launched in October.137 
They have had trouble deciding on their public image. 
Their new urban “people’s courts” drew enthusiastic 
business from those fed up with the state judiciary but 
harsh criticism from the press and mainstream politicians. 
That Prachanda’s promise to close the courts in major 
cities138 has not been kept in Kathmandu139 reflects the 
Maoists’ difficulty in deciding which approach would 
win more support rather than revealing a lack of 
discipline. Attempts to foster sympathy by using cadres 
 
 
131 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, 
October-November 2006. 
132 A subsequent Crisis Group report will examine in detail 
recent changes in Maoist politics and tactics. 
133 A task force under Badal submitted restructuring proposals at 
the end of November and proposed names for the interim 
legislature. The proposed new structure would follow the existing 
administrative districts and electoral constituencies rather than the 
demarcations the Maoists had been using. Crisis Group 
interview, Maoist source, Kathmandu, November 2006. 
134 Prachanda, press statement, 13 November 2006. 
135 Crisis Group interviews, leftist leaders, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
136 Crisis Group interview, Maoist valley bureau source, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
137 Ibid. The Newars, the original inhabitants of the 
Kathmandu valley, are an important constituency that has 
never embraced the Maoists but is historically left-leaning 
and appears disillusioned with the mainstream parties. On 
Newar participation in the April movement, see Crisis Group 
Report, From People Power to Peace, op. cit. 
138 Prachanda, press statement, 3 July 2006. 
139 Kantipur Television showed footage of one of the courts 
delivering a verdict. 
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to clean streets and target organised crime likewise 
prompted mixed reactions.140  
The Maoists also are having internal debates. Despite 
victory rallies after signing the CPA, their declaration of 
an end to the war has caused some disquiet.141 The 
leaders have to sell significant compromises to political 
and military cadres who consider themselves undefeated 
but must lock up their weapons without achieving their 
minimum goal of a republic, join as a minority party an 
interim parliamentary set-up of the type they had so 
trenchantly criticised and dissolve the “people’s 
governments” which many regard as the most concrete 
achievement of ten years of war. The leadership still 
believes that focusing on the constituent assembly as an 
interim step makes sense: a central committee member 
explained that the hope remains of establishing their 
own government in an unspecified future.142 But this is 
a tough sell to local activists, especially if power in the 
villages has to be traded for legislative and ministerial 
berths for a select few. 
The August-September 2006 central committee meeting 
addressed both broader policy issues and internal 
discipline. The leadership line on the talks was accepted 
after heated debate, and there was an admission that 
working methods needed much reform. The political 
report criticised lower-level leaders and cadres for using 
force to compensate for weakness in ideological and 
political campaigning.143 The meeting also laid down a 
strict line on party discipline.144 For now, despite some 
tensions between the leadership and the grass-roots, the 
 
 
140 The Maoists launched an anti-crime “Operation CC (crime 
control)”, detaining over 100 alleged criminals, 37 of whom 
were put on display, alongside stolen property and weapons, 
at a press conference. “Aparadh niyantran apareshan saphal”, 
Krishnasenonline.org, 21 October 2006. They also patrolled 
streets in the tourist hub of Thamel during the Tihar festival. 
Alok Tumbahangphey, “Red Road”, Nepali Times, 20-26 
October 2006. 
141 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist district and regional level 
activists, Kathmandu, November 2006. Rabindra Shrestha, 
who left the Maoists in March 2006 after a dispute with 
Prachanda, has called on cadres to revolt against him and 
Bhattarai, whom he describes as traitors who betrayed the 
people’s war. Interview with Rabindra Shrestha, Ghatana ra 
Bichar, 29 November 2006. 
142 Crisis Group interview, Maoist central committee 
member, Kathmandu, November 2006. 
143 “Aitihasik sambhavana ra aitihasik chunauti”, CPN(M) 
central committee-approved document, Sanshleshan, September 
2006. 
144 Crisis Group interview, Maoist central leader, Kathmandu, 
September 2006. 
Maoists remain cohesive, with overall command and 
control throughout their movement. 
The Maoist leadership has also been devoting attention 
to improving its international image and building 
relationships with key states. Their international department 
chief summarises policy priorities as neutralising Indian 
opposition, increasing ties with China and maintaining a 
critical stance towards the U.S.145 Prachanda was at 
pains to praise India’s role in the transition during his 
first open visit to New Delhi on 18-19 November 
2006.146 He met Indian leaders – primarily former prime 
ministers, the current government being still not ready 
for formal contact – and announced that for the Maoists 
“India is no longer a reactionary state”.147 His revelation 
that they had rejected help from Pakistani intelligence in 
1997 was calculated to make press headlines.148 
C. THE PALACE 
King Gyanendra was the main loser when his fragile 
direct rule crumbled. While he avoided total defeat and 
still commands the loyalty of some powerful friends, 
parliament’s many small cuts have eroded his dignity 
and influence. He has been comprehensively sidelined 
from public life and shorn of almost all ceremonial 
duties; even the sympathetic forces around the palace, 
including the army, seem to have lost faith in the 
monarchy as a political rallying point. While it is 
premature to predict the public verdict – the idea of the 
monarchy is still powerful even if the incumbent is 
unpopular – the chances of a major palace comeback 
have diminished. 
On his few public appearances since April, Gyanendra 
has cut a lonely figure. Prime Minister Koirala and 
army chief Katwal did not accompany the king and 
queen at the indra jatra and phulpati festivals as they 
would have in the past. The king no longer gives assent 
to acts of parliament or receives ambassadors’ 
credentials; he has lost his role as supreme commander 
of the army and the CPA leaves even his position as 
head of state unclear. Nevertheless, the palace has 
tenaciously retained some levers of power. Despite 
cooler relations (each blaming the other for the fiasco of 
royal rule), the divorce of king and army has yet to be 
 
 
145 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, September 2006. 
146 An invitation to speak at the Hindustan Times leadership 
summit had already suggested a receptive audience. 
147 “Prachanda declares: India is no longer a reactionary 
state”, The Himalayan Times, 18 November 2006. 
148 “Aaiesaaiko sahayog asvikar garyaun”, Kantipur, 20 
November 2006. 
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implemented. Some public distancing is not the same as 
a real transfer of control to the government and, despite 
declarations, the palace military secretariat has not been 
disbanded.149 The palace still directly commands the 
3,000-strong royal guard, a sophisticated force that 
includes units such as a mortar company based outside 
the Narayanhiti complex. 
The palace secretariat – the key centre of control under 
royal rule – is still intact despite parliament’s announcement 
that it would be brought into the normal civil service 
and reduced. The press secretariat has regained the 
confidence to rebut controversial accusations.150 At the 
CPA signing ceremony, Prime Minister Koirala and 
Prachanda both mentioned that there is still a rightist 
threat to democracy, implying the palace could try to 
undermine the deal.151 One new group even threatened 
to launch a violent struggle to defend the king.152 Such 
crude efforts are unlikely to attract much support, even 
from the palace, as long as the CPA process holds out 
hope of salvaging an acceptable compromise. This is 
the preferred option of Kathmandu’s pro-monarchy 
elites, who do not want an end to the institution but lack 
the capacity to intervene directly on its behalf. 
The king appears to be testing the situation; his advisors 
hope that problems with the peace process may yet give 
the palace openings to regain prestige. Gyanendra 
refused to respond to the Rayamajhi commission’s 
written queries about his role in suppressing the April 
movement, and he has been consulting with his allies 
and restoring his information-gathering systems.153 But 
he seems to have learned some subtlety and diplomacy. 
He publicly welcomed the CPA, even though it further 
curtailed his powers, saying he hoped “a prosperous 
 
 
149 “Sainik sachivalay ajhai sakriya”, Kantipur, 7 September 
2006. Principle Military Secretary Maj.-Gen. Gajendra Limbu 
still works at the palace and the government has not established a 
proposed royal security coordination unit in the Defence Ministry 
to replace the palace’s own aide-de-camp office. 
150 The press secretariat promptly rebutted charges that 
Crown Prince Paras was involved in buying arms during a 
trip to Austria. “Yubarajko samlagnata chaina”, Kantipur, 4 
September 2006. An allegation that the British government 
paid the palace a royalty in return for Gurkha recruitment was 
similarly dealt with. “Palace denies malicious report’’, 
People’s Review, 21 September 2006. 
151 “Comprehensive Peace Accord signed, armed insurgency 
declared officially over”, nepalnews.com, 21 November 2006. 
152 The Nepal Janatantrik Party, formed in the far-west district 
of Kailali, has so far done little more than issue press releases. 
“Party to take up arms in king’s support”, The Himalayan 
Times, 16 October 2006. 
153 Crisis Group interview, palace source, Kathmandu, 
September 2006. 
Nepal can now be built with the collective efforts of all 
the Nepalis”.154 Insiders explained that this move was 
proposed by the prime minister, who is willing to help 
the king restore the monarchy’s image as long as he 
stays out of politics.155 
D. CIVIL SOCIETY 
Civil society was unified and important during the April 
movement but since then group and individual interests 
have diverged. Some have adopted a radical stance, 
pushing policies such as a republic; others have been 
drawn into the fringes of government, for example by 
appointments to the Rayamajhi commission and the 
ceasefire code of conduct national monitoring committee. 
The Maoists and NC(D) had proposed seats for civil 
society in the interim legislative, interim government 
and constituent assembly; all parties have used patronage 
to reward their civil society supporters. 
The parties never enjoyed criticism by self-appointed 
civil society groups. While some civil society figures 
were quick to rebuild relations in hope of reward, others 
felt it all the more important to criticise government 
performance and act as a vocal watchdog. The Citizens’ 
Movement for Democracy and Peace, the most prominent 
such group, played an important role paving the way for 
the April movement. However, its campaign for a 
republic and insistence on rapid implementation of 
agreements led intellectuals close to the SPA to accuse 
it of being soft on the Maoists, a charge its leaders deny. 
There has also been a shift in the outlook of the 
mainstream media. Publishers had been forced by their 
journalists to take a strong line against the king after the 
royal coup, and the non-government press strongly 
supported the April movement. In its aftermath, 
publishers’ and journalists’ interests have converged: 
most are close to the mainstream parties and worry 
about the Maoists gaining too much power. The daily 
press has been quick to highlight Maoist misbehaviour, 
while some prominent publications have softened their 
line on the monarchy. The largest daily, Kantipur, 
criticised the Federation of Nepalese Journalists’ 
decision to campaign for a democratic republic.156 
 
 
154 “King lauds treaty”, The Himalayan Times, 23 November 
2006. 
155 Crisis Group interview, NC central leader, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
156 “Patrakar mahasangh ganatantraka pakshama”, Kantipur, 
20 November 2006; “Peshako maryada” (editorial), Kantipur, 
21 November 2006. 
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Despite these divisions and shifts, public opinion, much 
of it channelled through the media and representative 
groups, has been an important spur to both sides to 
make a success of the peace process. The direct influence 
exerted by protestors in April has died away but all 
parties know there will be a tough fight for constituent 
assembly votes: anyone considered an obstacle to peace 
is likely to pay a price at the ballot box. 
E. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Although differences of interest and emphasis persist, 
the international community has been broadly helpful 
during the difficult months of negotiation. India has 
retained its pre-eminent influence – all parties, especially 
the Maoists, are still keen to curry its favour – and can 
claim credit for having quietly helped shape the 
settlement framework. The U.S. has found it difficult to 
revise its assessment that any solution other than 
reunion of the palace and parties to combat the Maoists 
invites disaster but has vocally supported the peace 
process while maintaining strong public pressure on the 
Maoists to change behaviour. China, long seen as 
favouring the palace, adjusted rapidly to build links 
with the Maoists and keep options open.157 Others, 
primarily Nepal’s development partners, offered moral 
support but were careful not to intervene in the 
negotiations.158 All have supported the UN role. 
The April movement was a success for India’s cautious 
engagement with the Maoists and facilitation of their 
November 2005 deal with the mainstream parties. 
India’s approach had been informed by two 
considerations: that the military situation made a 
political solution more urgent; and that Gyanendra 
could not be trusted and had to be taught a lesson, if 
need be by using the Maoists. This policy shift was not 
without risks: it was hard to sell in New Delhi and never 
convinced the U.S. Nevertheless, the hope that Nepal’s 
Maoists joining the mainstream could also send a lesson 
 
 
157 Maoist leaders Dev Gurung, Ananta and Dinanath Sharma 
attended a party hosted by the Nepal-China Society, a 
Chinese embassy-funded NGO, on 21 September 2006 and 
chatted over cocktails with Chinese diplomats, including the 
ambassador; a senior diplomat commented positively on them 
to journalists, Kantipur TV news bulletin, 22 September 2006. 
Prachanda had a first official meeting with Chinese diplomats 
but a Chinese communist party delegation in late November 
met only SPA leaders. 
158 See, “Int’l community should not impose ideas on Nepal 
peace process: Hall”, The Kathmandu Post, 21 October 2006.  
to their Indian counterparts made it a worthwhile 
gambit.159 
Success brought its own problems. With Gyanendra 
moved aside, there was domestic concern about the 
Maoists and much more critical questioning of 
engagement with them. The government’s apparent 
weakness in acceding to Maoist demands in the eight-
point agreement added to such concerns.160 Indian 
policy reportedly compensated for the dangers of a 
seemingly weak government by ensuring that the army 
remained untouched as a last line of leverage with the 
Maoists.161 But the public line simply stayed with the 
“course correction” that then-Foreign Secretary Shyam 
Saran had issued following the rejection of the king’s 
first proclamation on 22 April, when he emphasised that 
Nepal’s political future “is really for the people of 
Nepal to decide.…We have been and continue to be 
firmly on the side of democratic forces in Nepal. There 
should be no ambiguity about that”.162 
New Delhi remained publicly cool to the Maoists. 
Although there were frequent, discreet lower-level 
contacts, there has been only one acknowledged meeting 
between Maoist leaders and Ambassador Shiv Shankar 
Mukherjee.163 Indian ministers are unlikely to engage 
with them formally until the arms issue is settled and 
the interim government established.164 Despite their 
underlying differences in analysis, the U.S.’s sustained 
pressure on the Maoists has been helpful to India, which 
 
 
159 This suggestion was not new. See S.D. Muni, Maoist 
Insurgency in Nepal: The Challenge and the Response (New 
Delhi, 2003), p. 67. 
160 Crisis Group interviews, New Delhi, July–October 2006. 
161 Nepali Congress sources suggest India advised Koirala not 
to move against senior army officers and to postpone reform 
of the institution. Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, 
September 2006. Commentators suspected fraternal relations 
with the Indian Army would have been jeopardised had the 
government pursued significant restructuring. C.K. Lal, 
“Shanti sansthagat garne chunauti”, Himal Khabarpatrika, 18 
October 2006. 
162 “Press Briefing by Foreign Secretary Shri Shyam Saran on 
Nepal”, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 22 April 2006. 
See Crisis Group Report, From People Power to Peace, op. cit. 
for an explanation of the context of this statement. 
163 This took place at the Indian Embassy on 31 October 2006. 
164 India has signalled its softening stance. In August, eleven 
mid-level Maoists leaders and cadres who had been detained 
in Patna for two years were released; two top leaders, C.P. 
Gajurel (Gaurav) and Mohan Baidya (Kiran), who had been 
arrested in 2003 and 2004 respectively, were set free on 1 
December. 
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does not have major differences with Washington over 
the desirability of early full disarmament.165 
 
 
165 U.S. Ambassador James F. Moriarty had consistently 
argued that the Maoists should not be allowed into 
government without disarming. “Don’t Include Maoists in 
Interim Govt Till They Disarm: Moriarty”, The Himalayan 
Times, 30 July 2006. He has been quick to criticise bad 
behaviour, warning that “the US stance on the Maoists would 
only change after seeing and observing their activities”. 
“Moriarty says Maoists not committed to agreement”, 
nepalnews.com, 1 December 2006. 
VI. THE ROAD AHEAD 
A. WILL IT WORK? 
1. Overambitious timetable 
The agreement is a solid basis for a lasting deal; its 
negotiation in the face of many obstacles demonstrates 
political will and aptitude. That said, the issues yet to be 
tackled are challenging and can still derail the process. 
Likely, deadlines will continue to be missed. That is not 
necessarily disastrous: ambitious timeframes have 
spurred talks, and slight slippage will not unduly upset 
the parties or the public. The crucial date is for 
constituent assembly elections. If the June 2007 target is 
missed, the next suitable opening will be after the 
monsoon and holidays, in November – a gap that could 
prompt disillusionment or misbehaviour from disgruntled 
parties. 
Although the elections seem a long way off, especially 
to negotiators engaged in complex talks, immediate 
steps are required to make them viable. The Election 
Commission has been able to make some preparations 
but can only proceed with firm plans once a new 
electoral law and associated regulations are in place. 
These have to be passed by the interim legislature – 
something that can only happen once an interim 
government is in place and with it agreement on 
appointments to crucial ministries and administrative 
positions. There should ideally be restored rule of law 
and an open environment for campaigning and public 
education months in advance of the polls. Even if the 
priority of peace encourages tolerance of less than ideal 
conditions – something that international observers may 
make difficult166 – there will need to be solid agreement 
on basic issues such as policing. 
One spur to quick progress is the prime minister’s poor 
health. At 84, Girija Prasad Koirala is acutely aware 
that he may not have the strength to guide the process 
for much longer. His age has made him physically frail 
but his seniority – he is a generation older than most 
other political leaders, including the king – has made it 
easier for the Maoists and rival SPA parties to accept 
 
 
166 The UN will monitor the constituent assembly election. 
The government and Maoists have also invited the Carter 
Center to observe the polls; it is to send ten long-term 
international observers and an additional 40 observers for the 
polls themselves. “Carter Center to observe CA polls”, 
ekantipur.com, 23 November 2006. The European Union has 
also offered to assist in monitoring. “EU pledges development 
assistance”, The Rising Nepal, 18 November 2006. 
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his leadership. The end of his active political life will 
spark power struggles within the NC, the SPA and the 
SPA-Maoist combine. This is one of the most pressing 
threats to the peace process. 
2. Keeping the process on track 
Problems with the negotiation process itself beset the 
talks until they resumed at the end of September 2006. 
Instead of solid, mutually agreed structures to engage 
and resolve day-to-day tensions, the process was 
heavily dependent on personal relations between a 
handful of top leaders and suffered badly when they 
disagreed. For example, from 9 August to 17 
September, Koirala and Prachanda did not even speak 
on the phone, jeopardising the entire process.167 The 
talks were opaque and exclusive – necessarily so at 
times, but not always inspiring public confidence. There 
was more quiet facilitation and technical support than in 
past efforts but structure still appeared occasionally 
lacking. 
Following the signing of the CPA, some of these 
problems look less threatening. “The communication 
gap … isn’t an issue any more”, said a figure involved 
in the November negotiations. “There are now good 
working relationships between plenty of people at 
different levels on both sides; they talk openly, stay in 
touch and generally get on well – so it’s unlikely 
there’ll be a breakdown there”.168 Nevertheless, it is 
important to keep some focus on the factors necessary 
to keep talks on track through the difficult stages to 
come. 
Mutual trust has improved but could still be fragile, 
especially if external events buffet the negotiations. As 
contentious topics move up the agenda, more 
confidence will be needed. This is particularly true for a 
final deal on arms and armies, since neither side has 
been chastened by defeat. It is likely that the UN will be 
drawn into an informal facilitation role in some areas, 
which could help stabilise the process but brings risks 
as it has no mandate for facilitation or mediation. Public 
pressure helped focus attention on the need for success 
but mutual confidence in a process that is strong enough 
to ride out inevitable ups and downs is more important. 
 
 
167 Bhojraj Bhat, “Hatiyarmai aljhiyo varta”, Nepal, 24 
September 2006. 
168 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, November 2006. 
3. Potential spoilers 
The momentum of a successful process backed by solid 
public support is the best guard against spoilers who are 
unhappy with the direction of the talks. To a large 
extent, the CPA has provided such momentum. Although 
some powerful lobbies are deeply suspicious of 
compromises with the Maoists, there is no evidence of a 
viable effort to derail the process. The Nepalese Army, 
understandably worried about Maoist intentions and its 
own future, remains in “wait and watch” mode – not yet 
an enthusiastic partner but not a determined opponent. 
Royalists are upset by the king’s humiliation and 
concerned about the future but, so far, lack the will and 
support to oppose developments. 
The biggest hopes and risks still attach to the 
negotiating parties themselves. The success of the talks 
so far has boosted those on each side who argued for a 
negotiated settlement but there remain those within the 
mainstream parties and the Maoists who are not yet 
convinced that other options can – or should – be closed. 
Unity and discipline, especially within the Maoist 
movement (whose cadres have more potential to disrupt 
the process if they break with their leaders), will be crucial. 
Finally there is a risk of the next stages being 
destabilised by external factors. There are still armed 
splinter groups outside the process, such as the Janatantrik 
Tarai Mukti Morcha (JTMM), a faction of former 
Maoists fighting for Tarai regional rights. It has mainly 
targeted the Maoists, who have declared “war” against 
it in return.169 For now, it is small, localised and too 
weak to disrupt the wider process; the same goes for 
other independent ethnic, religious or royalist fronts 
which exist more in name than in practice. But if the 
process founders and powerful backers choose to boost 
such groups, they could cause real problems, however 
limited their political base. In such circumstances, 
disaffection among Maoist cadres could also trigger a 
return to wider conflict, with or without their leaders’ 
approval. 
 
 
169 When JTMM killed two Maoists cadres in Saptari, Maoist 
leader Matrika Yadav declared war against it at a press 
conference on 17 July 2006 in Rajbiraj. “Maoists Declare 
War Against Breakaway Faction”, The Himalayan Times, 18 
July 2006. The most recent exchange of fire was in Saptari on 
18 October 2006. Dilli Ram Khatiwada, “Maoists, JTMM 
trade fire”, The Kathmandu Post, 19 October 2006. The 
JTMM has also targeted other hill-origin people, including 
mainstream party workers. 
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B. FROM ARMS MANAGEMENT TO 
DEMILITARISATION 
1. Implementing the arms management 
agreement 
The Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of 
Arms and Armies was signed on 28 November and 
witnessed by the UN.170 It had already been agreed in 
early November that the Maoist fighters would be 
cantoned with their weapons under a UN-supervised 
single-lock system;171 the Nepalese Army would 
reciprocate by restricting all but essential activities and 
keeping a similar number of arms locked under a 
parallel system. This framework was hard to achieve, 
and the full deal required intensive bargaining, partly 
because the UN’s need for a specific mandate 
necessitated a document without the ambiguities and 
deferrals common to the other peace deals. 
Practical progress has been quick on some fronts. The 
Maoists had in effect started the cantonment process 
immediately after the April movement, largely because 
the ceasefire rendered the PLA the least important of 
their wings. Preparing for cantonment was a relatively 
cost-free way to signal goodwill and distract attention 
from the lingering issue of their separate local militias 
while starting to argue that the government should 
contribute to the force’s upkeep. Since the agreement 
was signed, they have set up a committee to manage the 
cantonment process; reports indicate that Maoist 
fighters assembled quickly in the designated areas, 
although their first task is to create their own shelters as 
little infrastructure is in place. 
Once the arms management agreement was reached, the 
government was quick to make a first tranche of funds 
available; it also formed a cantonment coordination 
office, headed by Joint Secretary Sushil Jung Bahadur 
Rana, and announced plans to establish camp 
management committees for each of the seven main 
cantonments. Indeed, there is already a profusion of 
committees; at the central level, a direction committee 
under the prime minister and an implementation 
committee under the chief secretary are also meant to 
 
 
170 Following some technical revisions by UN lawyers in 
New York, Ian Martin signed the agreement on behalf of the 
UN on 8 December.  
171 The summit had settled on the locations for camps: Kailali, 
Surkhet, Rolpa, Palpa, Kavre, Sindhuli and Ilam; Palpa and 
Kavre were later changed to Nawalparasi and Chitwan. These 
seven districts will host divisional headquarters; three 
brigades will be positioned within two hours’ drive of each 
main cantonment, giving a total of 28 camps. 
assist PLA camp management, on top of which the 
government has separately formed a PLA cantonment 
management committee under Home Minister Krishna 
Sitaula, with a technical committee to assist it.172 
The UN has a critical role in monitoring arms and 
armies and has already moved quickly to put mechanisms 
in place. In a rapid response to a request from the 
Secretary-General, the Security Council authorised 
immediate deployment of 60 new personnel (35 for 
arms monitoring, 25 to support the electoral process) as 
well as an assessment team to recommend how to 
establish a full mission. 
2. Possible problems 
This rapid progress does not in itself remove all 
difficulties. The UN’s task of registering Maoist fighters 
will be far from straightforward. As well as verifying 
identities, monitors are expected to weed out recent 
recruits (in order to boost their numbers the Maoists 
have cajoled and forced many to join during the peace 
talks) and the under-aged. The limited number of 
monitors will have little capacity for independent 
verification, and the Maoists will push them to accept 
their own records. Registering weapons will be more 
straightforward and also one of the more measurable 
tests of Maoist commitment, as the army and police will 
be able to compare the numbers handed in with what 
they know the Maoists seized from them. 
Assuming these issues can be addressed – and they 
likely will be, with some fudging – the main question 
will be what the PLA does inside the cantonments, how 
it is provided for and how disaffection can be avoided if 
the process slows. Practical difficulties have already 
been suggested by a reported outbreak of illness 
affecting 100 fighters in one camp. Maoist commanders 
complained the camp lacked basic infrastructure, 
including a water supply, and that the initial government 
funds covered only two weeks’ expenses.173 If CA 
elections are delayed, there will be far greater problems 
during the monsoon, with attendant risk of illness. Even 
if elections go ahead on time, dismantling the camps 
 
 
172 “Govt provides Rs 70m to Maoists for management of 
cantonments”, nepalnews.com, 23 November 2006. The 
technical committee formed on 6 December 2006 includes 
Nawaraj Khatri, Ram Chandra Poudel, Surya Bhakta and 
Sharad Shrestha representing the government and Chandra 
Khanal (Baldev), Lok Bahadur Raut, Jagat Shrestha and 
Laxmi Devkota from the Maoists. “Prabidhik samittee 
gathan”, Kantipur, 7 December 2006.  
173 Ramesh Chandra Adhikari, “Hundreds of Maoists fall sick 
in camp”, The Kathmandu Post, 8 December 2006. 
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can only take place when the future of their occupants 
has been decided. 
The government army also has challenges, although the 
practicalities of registering its troops and weapons and 
accommodating them satisfactorily should be less of a 
problem. Like the Maoists, it has already started 
showing goodwill, for example by mapping the 
landmines it planted to protect bases,174 but it still has 
some way to go to show that it is under government 
control. Despite having agreed to a freeze and being 
ordered by the government to stop, it has been 
recruiting.175 It says it is only filling some 4,000 vacant 
slots but such behaviour could cause friction and points 
to the continuing weakness of democratic controls. 
Misunderstandings are also likely to arise while it 
carries out the essential duties agreed to under the peace 
deal. As noted, the Maoists held eleven army vehicles 
for two hours in November on suspicion of carrying 
weapons, releasing them after negotiations.176 Army 
headquarters warned that the Maoists would be held 
responsible for any interference with military activities.177 
None of these problems is insurmountable. Overcoming 
them requires continued political will, astute management 
(including by the UN and national monitors) and further 
confidence building. However, the management of arms 
is only a small part of the big picture. In early November, 
Maoist cadres in Pokhara asked their chairman: “What 
should we do if the enemy attacks us after we lock up 
our weapons?” Prachanda responded: “The keys will be 
with us. If that situation arises, pick up your guns and 
fight”.178 Making sure such a situation does not arise 
will require more than just fulfilling the terms of the 
arms management agreement. 
3. Towards demilitarisation 
The limited management of weapons and soldiers is 
well short of full Maoist disarmament or reorientation 
of the state security sector to peacetime. The focus on 
arms and armies also tends to obscure the broader 
challenge of demilitarisation. Building a stable peace 
demands more than taking guns out of people’s hands – 
 
 
174 “Senalai aaphnai bamko sanaso”, Jana Aastha, 6 
December 2006. 
175 The current strength of the Nepalese Army is around 
93,000. “Senama pheri bharna”, Kantipur, 15 November 2006. 
176 This incident took place on 2 November in Paurahi, 
Rautahat district. “Senaka gadi dedh ghanta maobadi 
niyantranma”, Nepal Samacharpatra, 3 November 2006. 
177 “Maobadilai senako chetawani”, Drishti, 7 November 2006. 
178 “Rajnitik mudda suljhiyo”, Kantipur, 6 November 2006. 
it also needs to take them out of politics. There is a long 
way to go on both the Maoist and state side. 
The longer-term challenge in demilitarising the Maoists 
is that armed action is an integral part of their political 
culture and strategy. Even if they can conform to 
normal democratic behaviour, it will be hard to make a 
permanent change in their worldview – especially in a 
way that does not prompt splits or serious indiscipline. 
For this, management of weapons is marginal. The 
Maoists have built themselves into a force to be 
reckoned with despite having only a fraction of the arms 
available to the state.179 They started with only two 
rifles and could restock without too much difficulty 
should they choose even after full disarmament. 
In the short term, the Maoists will likely retain the 
capacity to intimidate even if they abide by the arms 
management deal. They are still an organised force with 
a known capacity for violence. That their frontline 
fighters are temporarily in camps does not mean that 
people will be free from fear. If their command 
structure and country-wide discipline remain intact they 
can be a formidable force even if armed only with sticks 
and knives. 
Demilitarisation will also be difficult for the state. 
Despite some preliminary moves, real military reform 
has yet to start.180 Democratic control depends on more 
determined political will and persuading the army that it 
must readjust its institutional culture. If peace lasts, 
Nepal will be burdened with a seriously oversized 
security sector: initial discussions about bringing it to 
manageable levels and reshaping it to be more efficient 
are urgently needed. 
Most importantly, only a viable final deal on security 
arrangements will give the Maoists confidence to 
sacrifice their independent military capacity and a 
proposition they can sell to their armed cadres. The 
interim government is to form a special committee to 
plan the merger of two armies. According to Maoist 
military commander Ananta, this committee will be 
tasked with democratising the NA and professionalising 
the PLA.181 However there is still a large gap between 
 
 
179 The Maoists have captured around 3,000 weapons from 
state security forces and have probably made and bought a 
similar number: in total, they may have 6,000–7,000 
weapons. Crisis Group interviews, army and Maoist sources, 
Kathmandu, September–October 2006. See Crisis Group 
Report Nepal’s Maoists, op. cit. for detailed estimates. 
180 Reform of the army will be the subject of a subsequent 
Crisis Group report. 
181 Interview with Ananta, Janadesh, 21 November 2006. 
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the sides’ thinking, and there will be great resistance in 
the NA to accept more than token numbers of ex-
Maoist fighters or many changes in a structure it argues 
is already professional and loyal. 
C. RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRATIC SPACE 
The major challenge in making the peace process work 
and paving the way for viable elections will be re-
establishing rule of law and democratic space across the 
country. This is also where the CPA is most vague, 
leaving many crucial steps to be decided by 
“understanding” between the parties.182 Apart from their 
arms, which are now out of the front line, the Maoists’ 
grip on much of the countryside is their strongest card. 
They are unwilling to surrender control that guarantees 
them continued influence and the chance to push their 
policies at local level. The mainstream parties insist 
their national organisations remain in good shape 
despite institutional absence from much of the country 
for several years and lingering dissatisfaction with their 
earlier record in power. But they have yet to push the 
Maoists hard on ensuring access to areas which they 
had been forced to abandon during the conflict. 
The almost complete lack of policing in the post-April 
period – in major cities as well as rural areas – 
illustrates the difficulties ahead. Although the CPA 
states clearly that the Nepal Police is the legitimate law-
enforcing body and will be allowed to operate without 
hindrance,183 the Maoists have not welcomed the re-
establishment of posts where they hold sway. Their 
behaviour suggests they will seek to negotiate each case 
individually and seek compensatory benefits. Proposed 
local peace councils could be a means of building trust 
and power-sharing mechanisms; they are backed by the 
government’s Peace Secretariat (which has had little 
role in the talks other than channelling some technical 
advice) and some donors.184 However their rationale is 
 
 
182 The CPA leaves many matters to be decided by 
“understanding” or “mutual consensus”. It commits both 
sides “to take individual and collective responsibility of 
resolving, with also the support of all political parties, civil 
society and local institutions, any problems arising in the 
aforementioned context on the basis of mutual consensus”, 
CPA, Article 5.2.9. The 8 November summit understanding 
had many similar provisions. 
183 The accord states (Article 5.1.6): “Nepal Police and 
Armed Police Force shall give continuity to the task of 
maintaining [the] legal system and law and order along with 
criminal investigation”. 
184 Crisis Group interviews, donor agencies, Kathmandu, 
December 2006. 
sketchy and their possible effectiveness, as well as the 
interests they represent, would be dependent on the 
same dynamics as any other local bodies. 
Maoist strategy continues to be in contradiction with 
their commitment to mainstream politics. Even if the 
formation of an interim government goes ahead 
smoothly and the Maoists join as a political party, they 
will retain the idea of representing their “new regime”. 
They have plans to continue their policies as far as 
possible, for example by reorganising the judiciary and 
bureaucracy from within the interim government.185 The 
“people’s governments” will only be dissolved once the 
interim legislature is in place; even then the plan is to 
keep shadow institutions in place by converting these 
bodies (which, however, still exist more in concept than 
daily administrative reality) into regional fronts. 
Change in Maoist policies depends not so much on an 
improbable change of heart over strategy as on the 
democratic parties showing more resolve in 
implementing the CPA. The parties remain top-heavy 
and focused on politics in the capital. They have not 
used the end of royal rule to move back into the 
villages. This may be partly due to Maoist obstruction, 
although central party leaders do not generally complain 
of this,186 but seems to reflect more a lack of will. There 
is also a problem of partisan interest: the UML had 
pushed to reinstate the old local bodies because it was 
the largest party in them; Congress and other parties 
have sidelined this for the same reason. Civil servants 
theoretically run administrations but in practice there is 
little government presence in the villages.187 
For ordinary citizens the picture is mixed. The end of 
all-out hostilities has brought relief and a renewed sense 
of security but much has yet to change. The CPA 
agreed to accelerate the process of returning houses, 
land and property confiscated by the Maoists but there 
has not yet been much delivery. The two sides have also 
vowed to create an environment for IDPs to return 
home, partly through bipartite district committees. The 
 
 
185 Baburam Bhattarai, “Shanti vartaka chunautiharu”, 
Sanshleshan, 20 August 2006. 
186 In one case, Maoists reportedly used violence to obstruct a 
planned UML meeting in mid-western Dailekh district. 
“Maoists explode bomb to terrorize UML activists”, 
nepalnews.com, 20 November 2006. 
187 A nationwide survey by the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in July found that 68 
per cent of Village Development Committee Secretaries were 
still displaced from their villages. “OCHA Nepal Situation 
Overview”, Kathmandu, 11 August 2006. Available at the 
UN Nepal Information Platform, http://www.un.org.np/. 
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CPA target of completing this process within one 
month is unrealistic; the UN is so concerned that it has 
launched a special inter-agency campaign to address the 
issue.188 
D. PEACE AND JUSTICE? 
Nepal faces sometimes competing imperatives of peace 
and justice. So far, attention has been given to the 
former, while plans to address accountability for crimes 
committed during the war remain vague and lack 
political momentum. The government took prompt 
steps to investigate possible abuses by the state against 
protestors in the April movement but follow-up has 
been limited. Neither the government nor the Maoists 
has shown any great appetite to pursue those 
responsible for the more significant violations over the 
course of the conflict. The peace deal promises a truth 
and reconciliation commission but its viability and 
public acceptability are yet to be explored. 
The zeal with which the government pursued security 
officials accused of abuses in April was undermined by 
a piecemeal and partial approach. The police and 
intelligence chiefs were rapidly suspended and then 
permanently relieved of commands.189 However, the 
government was pressured not to suspend the army chief, 
Pyar Jung Thapa, although the army acknowledged it 
controlled all security forces during April under the 
Unified Command system.190 Second-rank officers in 
the regular and armed police appeared to be judged by 
their connections rather than their actions: The deputy 
chief of the armed force, Ravi Raj Thapa, was 
suspended despite the fact that he was in charge of 
human resources and not part of the command chain; 
Basudev Oli, who was responsible for operations, was 
promoted to become the new chief.191 Attempts to deal 
 
 
188 “Presidential statement expresses support for political 
mission to monitor arms, elections; advance deployment of 
essential personnel”, UN Security Council, 1 December 2006, 
available at http://www.un.org.np. 
189 The police chief, Shyam Bhakta Thapa, and the armed 
police chief, Sahabir Thapa, were transferred to the Home 
Ministry as “special officers” after three-month suspensions; 
The National Investigation Department chief, Deviram 
Sharma, retired. Om Bikram Rana is the new police chief; 
Dhana Singh Karki replaced Sharma. 
190 The Unified Command put the army in operational control 
of the civil police, armed police and national intelligence 
agency; its dissolution was announced after the April 
movement. 
191 Home Minister Sitaula’s 17 July decision to reinstate 53 
police sub-inspectors was also controversial. They had been 
dismissed four years earlier for refusing to serve in conflict 
with the security forces’ political masters got off to a 
similarly inauspicious start, as former royal ministers were 
detained without charge, then freed by the courts.192 
Nepal has a mixed experience with transitional justice. 
In the wake of the 1990 democracy movement, a judicial 
commission under former Supreme Court Justice 
Mallik recommended action against those responsible 
for abuses but none was taken. This enabled a smooth 
transition and probably encouraged figures from the old 
regime not to spoil the democratic elections; however, 
some key officials and politicians criticised by the 
Mallik Commission in 1990 resurfaced to reprise their 
role in April 2006.193 
In May 2006, the government formed a similar High-
Level Probe Commission (HLPC), under former Supreme 
Court Judge Krishna Jung Rayamajhi, to investigate 
abuses of state power and funds since the royal coup of 
February 2005. It submitted a 1,400-page report on 20 
November 2006 recommending action against 202 
people including King Gyanendra and his cabinet (a 
minority report complained that the king had been let 
off lightly).194 
A five-member cabinet committee under Deputy Prime 
Minister K.P. Oli will suggest how to implement that 
report.195 Signs are that Prime Minister Koirala would 
prefer a quiet compromise to an acrimonious pursuit of 
high-profile targets.196 Fearing this, MPs from various 
                                                                                       
areas but convinced Sitaula they had been victimised because 
of their democratic convictions. Biswamani Pokhrel, 
“Bhagaudalai swagat”, Samaya, 24 August 2006. 
192 The government detained former royal ministers Kamal 
Thapa, Ramesh Nath Pandey, Shrish Shamsher Rana and 
Nikshya Shamsher Rana under the Public Security Act in 
May 2006. The Supreme Court released them after three 
weeks, observing that there were no real cases against them, 
and their arrests appeared to have been politically motivated. 
193 See Crisis Group Report, Electing Chaos, op. cit. 
194 Two commission members, Ram Kumar Shrestha and 
Kiran Shrestha, dissented, dissatisfied that it did not 
recommend strong action against the king despite finding him 
directly involved in suppressing the April movement. Crisis 
Group interview, HLPC source, Kathmandu, November 
2006. The HLPC heard evidence from 294 people, including 
security officials, civil servants, royal ministers and palace 
officials. Only the king, questioned in his role as then head of 
government, refused to cooperate. 
195 Other members of the committee, formed on 27 
November 2006, are Krishna Sitaula, Gopal Man Shrestha, 
Hridayesh Tripathi and Narendra Bikram Nembang.  
196 Koirala rejected the recommendation to suspend the army 
chief. He also visited the palace to smooth feathers ruffled 
when Rayamajhi summoned the king’s principal secretary, 
Pashupati Bhakta Maharjan, to testify on 31 August 2006. 
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parties have pressed the government to publish the 
report and act promptly on its recommendations.197 Oli 
has insisted that “the Rayamajhi panel’s report will not 
face the same fate [as the Mallik report]” but has 
remained non-committal on the form of any follow-up 
action;198 his committee did not meet for more than a 
week after its formation. 
It is unclear how the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission proposed in the CPA will function. In the 
absence of serious public debate, its suitability is 
unproven. It is almost certain that any legal measures 
will be decided and implemented domestically, without 
recourse to international justice mechanisms. But there 
may still be a role for international technical assistance, 
and international rights organisations will keep up 
pressure for accountability.199 Meanwhile, for relatives 
of victims, especially families whose breadwinners 
were killed or disappeared, financial compensation and 
security are probably as important as justice and 
psychological closure. 
                                                                                       
Crisis Group interview, cabinet minister, Kathmandu, 
September 2006. Maharjan met the prime minister again 
immediately before the king refused to respond to questions, 
leading some to suspect his non-cooperation had the prime 
minister’s blessing. 
197 “Implement Rayamajhi Commission report, MPs tell 
govt”, nepalnews.com, 7 December 2006. 
198 “Interview with DPM K.P. Oli”, ekantipur.com, 7 
December 2006. 
199 Human Rights Watch has pointed out that the CPA makes 
no mention of the judicial or penal measures that will be used 
to enforce accountability. “Nepal: After Peace Agreement, 
Time for Justice: Army, Maoists Must Account for Killings, 
‘Disappearances’”, Human Rights Watch, New York, 1 
December 2006. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Nepal’s peace agreement reflects determined leadership 
and much hard-headed political necessity: neither the 
SPA nor the Maoists had attractive alternatives to 
making the talks work. Although their goals remain 
very different, there is a much more solid convergence 
of interests than in earlier, failed efforts to reach a 
negotiated settlement. 
The collapse of the 2003 negotiations paved the way for 
the king to sideline the mainstream parties, and they are 
now more aware that their popular legitimacy and grip 
on power is largely dependent on delivering peace. The 
Maoists have not abandoned their ideology, admitted 
defeat or abandoned the possibility of reverting to 
armed insurgency. However, they have little to gain 
through further military action and probably see 
mainstream politics as a more profitable route, as long 
as it affords them a serious share of power at the centre 
and the chance to retain local influence and achieve 
their goals. 
Making the agreement work means building on these 
shared interests and ensuring that progress limits room 
for spoilers to undermine the process. In practice this 
translates into managing successful elections and then 
delivering a stable, long-term settlement through the 
constituent assembly. The first task requires serious 
preparation: free and fair polls will only be possible if 
the resolution of outstanding issues leads to a rapid 
restoration of democratic space and government across 
the country. 
The election of the constituent assembly will not in 
itself guarantee smooth functioning, especially if there 
is deadlock on important topics, but it will provide a 
clear popular mandate, the crucial element that has been 
absent from national politics since 2002. Once elected, 
the CA will present new challenges; depending on the 
balance of power and willingness of the parties to 
cooperate these may be more intractable than the 
threshold issues. Public pressure for peace and 
economic progress will remain the best incentive for all 
parties to deliver a lasting solution. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 15 December 2006
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2001 
27 July: Government and Maoists declare ceasefire and 
announce negotiations. 
13-14 September: At second round of talks Maoists 
submit 31 demands including constituent assembly. 
23 November: Following deadlock in third talks, Maoists 
end ceasefire and attack the army. 
26 November: Government declares nationwide state of 
emergency and mobilises army for the first time. 
2002 
22 May: Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba dissolves 
parliament for fresh elections after dispute with party 
president Girija Prasad Koirala over extending state of 
emergency. 
4 October: King Gyanendra dismisses Prime Minister 
Deuba; assumes executive power. 
11 October: King appoints RPP leader Lokendra Bahadur 
Chand prime minister. 
2003 
29 January: Bilateral ceasefire announced; government 
appoints Narayan Singh Pun as talks coordinator; Maoists 
announce five-member talks team under Baburam 
Bhattarai (1 February). 
April-May: Government reshuffles negotiation team; two 
rounds of talks make no substantive progress. 
5 July: NC, UML, NSP, Janamorcha Nepal and NWPP 
sign eighteen-point agreement in first alliance against 
royal rule. 
30 May: Prime Minister Chand resigns; king appoints 
Surya Bahadur Thapa prime minister (4 June); he forms 
new talks team (12 June). 
July-August: Disagreement over constituent assembly at 
third round of talks; army kills nineteen unarmed Maoists 
in Doramba, Ramechhap; Maoists pull out of talks and 
end ceasefire (27 August). 
2004 
7 May: Prime Minister Thapa resigns; King reappoints 
Sher Bahadur Deuba prime minister (2 June); he forms 
coalition government. 
2005 
1 January: King dismisses Prime Minister Deuba in coup 
restoring direct palace rule. 
April: Secret NC-Maoist talks start in New Delhi. 
10 April: Government signs agreement with UNOHCHR 
for Nepal office (established in May 2005). 
8 May: NC, NC(D), UML, Janamorcha Nepal, NWPP, 
ULF and NSP form Seven-Party Alliance (SPA). 
10-15 July: UN Special Advisor Lakhdar Brahimi visits 
Nepal and later holds talks with New Delhi (September). 
3 September: After progress in semi-secret talks with 
SPA, Maoists announce three-month unilateral ceasefire; 
royal government refuses to reciprocate. 
19 October: SPA formally initiates talks with Maoists. 
22 November: SPA and Maoists sign twelve-point 
agreement as basis for joint movement against the king to 
establish “total democracy”. 
28 November: Prachanda announces CPN(M) central 
committee meeting has endorsed joint movement with 
SPA. 
2 December: Maoists extend unilateral ceasefire by one 
month; government again does not reciprocate. 
2006 
January: Maoists end four-month ceasefire with 
numerous attacks across country. 
8 February: Government holds municipal elections; SPA 
and most other parties boycott. 
5 April: SPA general strike and Maoist blockades 
launched; start of “people’s movement”. 
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6-24 April: Movement continues with growing public 
support, clashes between police and protesters and mass 
defiance of curfews; king’s offer to appoint SPA prime 
minister rejected (21 April); King surrenders power and 
reinstates parliament (24 April). 
25 April: Maoists call to continue the movement greeted 
with public indifference. 
26 April: Maoists announce three-month unilateral 
ceasefire. 
30 April: Girija Prasad Koirala takes oath as prime 
minister; formally invites Maoists for talks. 
3 May: Government announces indefinite ceasefire; 
withdraws “terrorist” tag and arrest warrants against 
Maoists leaders. 
13 May: CPN(M) announces its central committee has 
approved ten-point roadmap for peace talks. 
18 May: Parliamentary proclamation asserts sovereignty 
and curtails king’s powers. 
26 May: Government and Maoists sign 25-point ceasefire 
code of conduct. 
16 June: Prachanda’s first public appearance in 
Kathmandu at meeting with SPA leaders to sign eight-
point agreement (to dissolve parliament, form interim 
government and invite UN to monitor arms); form interim 
constitution drafting committee (which submitted 
incomplete draft on 24 August). 
Late June: dissatisfaction within SPA over promise to 
dissolve parliament. 
2 July: Government writes unilaterally to UN S-G Kofi 
Annan proposing decommissioning of Maoist arms. 
12 July: Government annouces $2 billion budget for fiscal 
year 2006–2007. 
24 July: Maoists write separately to UN protesting 
reference to “decommissioning”; serious loss of trust 
between government and Maoists. 
27 July-3 August: UN assessment mission visits Nepal. 
28 July: Maoists extend ceasefire for three months. 
9 August: Government and Maoists agree parallel five-
point letters to UN requesting monitoring of arms and 
elections. 
27 August-2 September: CPN(M) central committee 
conditionally endorses talks and forms ten-member high-
level talks team under Prachanda but also prepares 
fallback plan for resumed struggle. 
13 September: Maoists call, then lift, nationwide 
shutdown amid rumours army is transporting Indian arms 
to Kathmandu. 
25 August: UN Secretary-General appoints Ian Martin as 
his Personal Representative to the peace process. 
28 September: Parliament passes Army Act increasing 
democratic control. 
Late September: more than a dozen private meetings 
between Koirala, Prachanda and close aides puts talks 
back on track. 
8, 10, 12 & 15 October: SPA-Maoist summit meetings 
announce constituent assembly election date of June 2007 
but fail to agree other issues. 
29 October: Maoists extend ceasefire for three months. 
31 October: Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee 
holds first meeting with Maoist leaders. 
8 November: SPA-Maoist summit meeting produces 
signed peace understanding; resolves some disputes over 
arms management and interim institutions. 
20 November: Rayamajhi Commission submits report 
recommending action against 202 people including King 
Gyanendra; government forms implementation committee 
(27 November). 
21 November: Government and Maoists sign 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement formally declaring end 
to the war. 
28 November: Government and Maoists sign Agreement 
on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, 
witnessed by UN. 
1 December: UN Security Council welcomes CPA, 
approves initial deployment of monitors and sends full 
assessment mission; deadline for formation of interim 
government missed. 
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situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. 
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed 
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foreign ministries and international organisations and 
made available simultaneously on the website, 
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governments and those who influence them, including 
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support for its policy prescriptions. 
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policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired 
by the former European Commissioner for External 
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